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The financial crisis of 2008 has led to dramatic changes in the
way that finance is regulated: the Dodd-Frank Act imposed broad and
systemic regulation on the industry on a level not seen since the New
Deal. But the financial regulatory reforms enacted since the crisis have
been premised on an outdated idea of what financial services look like
and how they are provided. Regulation has failed to take into account
the rise of financial technology (or "fintech") firms and the fundamental
changes they have ushered in on a variety of fronts, from the way that
banking works, to the way that capital is raised, even to the very form of
money itself. These changes call for a wide-ranging reconceptualization
of financial regulation in an era of technology-enabled finance. In
particular, this Article argues that regulators' focus on preventing the
risks associated with "too big to fail" institutions overlooks the
conceptually distinct risks associated with small, decentralized
financial markets. In many ways, these risks can be greater than those
presented by large institutions because decentralized fintech markets are
more vulnerable to adverse economic shocks, less transparent to
regulators, and more likely to encourage excessively risky behavior by
market participants. The Article concludes by sketching out a variety of
regulatory responses that better correspond to fintech's particular risks
and rewards.
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INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis of 2008 ushered in the most sweeping
reform of financial regulation in the United States since the New Deal.
Alarmed by the systemic risk that financial institutions posed to the
broader economy, as well as perceived abuses engendered by the "too
big to fail" mindset among banking executives, legislators moved
quickly to impose a slew of new requirements on the financial sector.
These reforms, passed under the umbrella of the Dodd-Frank Act,
drastically altered the regulatory landscape for financial institutions.'
Wall Street firms found themselves subject to a bewildering array of
new regulatory requirements, from restrictions on proprietary
investing (the so-called Volcker Rule), to obligatory stress testing of
banks' ability to withstand various crisis scenarios, to more stringent
reporting requirements.
At the same time that Congress was focused on fixing Wall
Street, dramatic changes were taking place in a less well-known and
still emerging sector of the financial world: the fintech sector. This
collection of start-ups and venture capital-backed companies were
using developments in network technology and "big data" analysis to
disrupt the way that financial services could be provided. From
crowdfunding to robo-advisors to Bitcoin, financial technology firms
have introduced innovations to a wide variety of areas and have allowed
smaller, nimbler competitors to enter the financial marketplace. In
1. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need
for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011) [hereinafter Coffee,
Systemic Risk]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012).
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doing so, the fintech revolution promises to produce great benefits for
the wider economy, including broader access to capital, fairer lending
standards, better investment advice, and more secure transactions. 2 It
is no wonder that Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase's CEO, warned
investors in 2015 that "Silicon Valley is coming." 3
But the rise of fintech poses a challenge for current financial
regulations. The Dodd-Frank reforms primarily aimed to prevent
traditional banks from repeating the excesses of the precrisis era. They
labeled certain financial institutions "systemically important" and
imposed a variety of reporting and structural requirements on these
actors. They created new regulators to police Wall Street and protect
investors from their depredations. But they did not foresee the shift
away from Wall Street that fintech firms had already started. The locus
of financial services is becoming increasingly decentralized, with more
and more areas of the financial sector being provided by small start-ups
focused on narrow segments of the financial market.4 The financial
reforms of the postcrisis years are ill suited to handle the challenges
presented by this new model of financial institution. Perhaps just as
importantly, the substance of financial regulation today may well stifle
beneficial innovation in the financial sector, precisely at a time when
other nations are racing to attract fintech to their jurisdictions.5
Because fintech is so new, and its ways of doing business so
2. See The Fintech Revolution, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://www.economist.comlnews/
leaders/21650546-wave-startups-changing-financefor-better-flntech-revolution [https://perma.cc/
3FQW-UUZC] (discussing benefits).
3. Jamie Dimon, Solid Strategy and Future Outlook, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (Apr. 8, 2015),
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/annual-report/2014/ar-solid-strategy.htm
[https://perma.cc/GN9Z-LAS4] (included in letter from Chairman and CEO to shareholders).
4. See Corinne Abrams, Fintech Startups Seek to Shake Up Money-Transfer Industry, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.wsj.comlarticles/fintech-startups-seek-to-shake-up-money-
transfer-industry-1513679401 [https://perma.cclW6ND-HTYA]; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Fintech
Firms Are Taking On the Big Banks, but Can They Win?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/fintech-firms-are-taking-on-the-big-
banks-but-can-they-win.html [https://perma.cclUY5Z-SKW2]; The Fintech Revolution, supra note
2.
5. Hong Kong regulators recently announced that they were creating a "supervisory
sandbox" in which fintech companies could operate without needing to comply with otherwise
applicable financial regulation. See Nathaniel Popper, Where Finance and Technology Come
Together, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/
business/dealbook/where-finance-and-technology-come-together.html [https://perma.cc/8VKB-
FLZK] (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Singapore Tries to Become a Fintech Hub,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21714384-
city-state-wants-fintech-bolsters-not-disrupts-mainstream [https://perma.ccl5G6K-25HZ].
Similarly, Britain's Financial Conduct Authority launched a new initiative, Project Innovate, to
assist fintech start-ups. See Popper, supra.
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unconventional, regulators are only beginning to come to terms with its
implications for financial regulation. 6
This Article argues that fintech poses a set of unique challenges
to financial regulation, challenges that require us to question many of
our fundamental understandings about the creation and propagation of
systemic risk in the economy. In particular, the rise of fintech will
undermine the widespread assumption that the primary source of
systemic risk in the financial sector is the domination of large,
"systemically important" banks and other financial institutions.7 This
6. In 2016, the Bank of England announced that one of its priorities was creating a
regulatory approach to fintech. Noting the difficulties involved with the endeavor, however, a Bank
of England official stated that "[i]t's very difficult to decide how to regulate something you don't
quite know what it is." See Huw Jones, BoE Says Won't Stifle Innovation As Wrestles with Fintech,
REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-boe-techboe-says-wont-stifle-
innovation-as-wrestles-with-fintech-idUKKCN11E107 [https://perma.cc/XWU6-H7RWi. On the
other hand, the European Union's European Banking Authority has delayed a decision on whether
fintech calls for new regulation. Its executive director has recently said that "[wie should wait and
see what uses the market is contemplating and whether that sort of use would imply the
emergence of new risks." See Huw Jones & Michelle Price, Blockchain Sends Banking Regulators
Back to Basics, REUTERS (May 20, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/finance-summit-
blockchain/reuters-summit-blockchain-sends-banking-regulators-back-to-basics-
idUSL5N18H23A [https://perma.cc/3GRG-3MHJ]. In Germany, the president of the national bank,
Jens Weidmann, has stated that "[g]etting a clearer picture of fintechs' business activities is
essential if we are to better understand whether and in what way they might pose a threat to
financial stability." See Fintech Sector Needs More Regulatory Oversight: Bundesbank, REUTERS
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-fintech-bundesbank/fintech-sector-needs-
more-regulatory-oversight-bundesbank-idUSKBN1591LV [https://perma.cc/ZY7J-53B5].
7. For prominent examples of this overriding focus on large financial institutions as the
source of systemic risk, see Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J.
CORP. L. 469, 476-77 (2010) (focusing its analysis of the proper response to financial distress on
the failure of large financial institutions); Felix B. Chang, The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks and
Clearinghouses Under Regulation, 2014 COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 747, 747 (arguing that
"[clonsolidation in the financial industry threatens competition and increases systemic risk");
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 154-55 (2011)
(arguing that, in order to prevent future financial crises, large financial firms should be forced to
self-insure against outbreaks of systemic distress); Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 4
HARV. Bus. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014) (stating that "[m]ost observers agree that the excessive debt or
leverage of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) was a central reason why the
housing crash of 2007-2009 led to a recession"); Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an
Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP.
L. REV. 449, 449 (2009) (viewing the problem of systemic risk as primarily an issue of the risk
posed by large, systemically important institutions); Michael C. Munger & Richard M. Salsman,
Is "Too Big to Fail" Too Big?, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 433 (2013) (testing the empirical effects of
government bailout policies on the incentives for excessive risk and leverage in financial
institutions); Andrew F. Tuch, Financial Conglomerates and Information Barriers, 39 J. CORP. L.
563 (2014) (analyzing the regulatory challenges posed by large financial conglomerates); Andrew
F. Tuch, The Fiduciary Dilemma in Large-Scale Organizations: A Comparative Analysis, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDuCIARY LAw (Andrew Gold & Gordon Smith eds., forthcoming 2018)
(describing the dangerous conflicts of interest that arise in large financial institutions); Manuel A.
Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779, 781 (2011)
(describing the systemic risk posed by "[mlodern financial institutions [that] are large, complex,
highly interconnected, and-compared to nonfinancial firms-fragile"); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The
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conventional view is based on a few simple observations. Large banks
have grown to such gargantuan proportions, and have become so
intricately connected with other sectors of the economy, that their
failure would have drastic consequences on economic growth and
activity. Governments, aware of this fact, thus have strong incentives
to bail out struggling banks that are deemed "too big to fail." This fact
alone, of course, might not be cause for concern-ex post, it is quite
rational and, indeed, desirable for governments to act to protect their
citizens from economic harm. But ex ante, the knowledge that
governments will do so has important-and perverse-effects on
decisionmaking. In particular, it incentivizes excessively risky behavior
by banks and their counterparties, who recognize that the implicit
government guarantee for large banks insulates them from any
harmful repercussions of their risky behavior. This dynamic came to a
head during the financial crisis of 2008, when risky bets on the
subprime housing market, shoddy lending standards, and the
widespread use of complex derivatives led to unprecedented losses in
the financial sector. Ever since, the guiding principle of financial reform
has been that systemic risk is a product of large, dominant financial
institutions and the "too big to fail" phenomenon. This belief has led to
significant shifts in both substantive regulation and regulatory
priorities.8
But this conventional wisdom about the source of systemic risk
in the financial sector underestimates the extent to which systemic risk
can be generated-not just by large, concentrated actors, but by small,
disaggregated ones as well. Markets characterized by atomized and
decentralized actors present unique risks, ones that may be more
worrisome than the risks presented by centralized markets. Perhaps
just as importantly, regulations aimed at preventing the risks of
centralization may lead to increases in the risks associated with
decentralization.
Fintech presents a particularly acute problem from the
perspective of systemic risk for three reasons. First, fintech firms,
Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L.
REV. 951, 954 (2011) (arguing that resolving the "too big to fail" subsidy for large financial firms
should be the primary objective of regulatory reforms in the financial sector); David Zaring, A Lack
of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 106, 126 (2010) (proposing that resolution authority should be
revised to require the government to create a public list of large, "nationalizable institutions" and
that such a reform would "ensure that the government's power to destroy is not overly broad").
8. On the other hand, President Donald Trump has taken a contrary position and promised
to roll back Wall Street regulation. See Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfield Davis, Trump Moves to
Roll Back Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress-financial-
regulations.html [https://perma.cc/2TWN-3CX5]. At the time of the writing of this Article, the
outcome of such efforts is uncertain.
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because of their size and business model, are more vulnerable to
adverse economic shocks than large financial institutions, and those
shocks are more likely to spread to other firms in the industry. Second,
fintech firms are more difficult to monitor and constrain than typical
financial institutions because regulators lack reliable information
about the structure and operations of fintech markets. Third, fintech
markets suffer from collective action problems that inhibit cooperation
among market actors.9 All of these problems suggest that fintech
presents a set of regulatory concerns that are different from-and in
many cases more severe than-the concerns presented by more
conventional financial institutions. Financial regulatory priorities must
shift to reflect these changes.10
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I will sketch out the
contours of the fintech industry and describe how fintech is
revolutionizing the ways in which financial services are provided. Part
II will outline the key regulatory reforms of the postcrisis era and efforts
to rein in systemic risk in the financial industry. Part III will identify
the ways in which financial regulation is inapt to deal with the unique
challenges and opportunities of fintech firms. Part IV will conclude by
proposing a set of regulatory reforms aimed at promoting innovation in
the financial industry while also ensuring stability and transparency.
9. As discussed below, infra Section III.C, an important contributing factor to this collective
action problem is the lower reputational constraints faced by fintech firms. While large banks
interact frequently with their largest stakeholders and regulators, fintech firms are smaller and
more decentralized, and thus may care less about their reputations. See Matthew D. Cain, Antonio
J. Macias & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private Equity
Contracting and Strategic Default, 40 J. CORP. L. 565 (2015); Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate
Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 41 (2010); William
Magnuson, The Public Cost of Private Equity, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2955175 [https://perma.cclVHN5-3FXD];
Jean Tirole, A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption
and to Firm Quality), 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1996). In addition, in markets with small,
decentralized actors, information diffusion is more problematic. See Enrico Perotti & Ernst-
Ludwig von Thadden, Investor Dominance and Strategic Transparency: On the Role of Corporate
Governance for Product and Capital Market Competition, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES:
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 363 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002). For a good overview of
the risk implications of fintech in the consumer finance area, see Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation
More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLAL. REV. 232 (2018).
10. It should be noted at the outset that fintech firms are not the only firms that possess the
risk-creating features identified here. Conceivably, other decentralized players in the financial
industry might also warrant regulation on similar grounds, as identified further below. But fintech
is unique because the very nature of the industry contributes to its distinctive risk. Its dependence
on technology as its primary innovation facilitates the kinds of features that make systemic risk
prevalent-it allows small actors to connect, it accelerates and magnifies problematic behaviors,
and it obscures the dissemination of transactional information.
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I. WHAT IS FINTECH?
The fintech industry has undergone tremendous growth over the
past few years. In 2015, investors poured over $19 billion into the
industry, an increase of 106% over the amount invested in 2014.11
Venture capital-backed fintech companies received $13.8 billion in
investments in 2015, six times the amount from 2011. There are now
twenty-seven fintech "unicorns," or private companies worth more than
$1 billion. 12 In 2016, Nasdaq even launched a financial technology index
to track the performance of companies specializing in financial
technology. 1 3 It is increasingly clear that fintech is now an essential
feature of the financial landscape.
Despite this explosion in the size and importance of fintech, the
industry itself is surprisingly ill defined. The term is sometimes used
broadly to refer to any use of technology in finance. This has led some
commentators to dismiss fintech as merely a fancy term for an old
concept: banks, after all, have always used technology of one sort or
another, and the mere fact that new technologies have emerged does
not suggest that these technologies have any unique effect on the
industry.14 Others have suggested that fintech is an unhelpful term
11. The Pulse of Fintech, 2015 in Review, KPMG & CB INSIGHTS 11 (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/damlkpmg/pdfl2016/03/the-pulse-of-fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/
634A-NC2F].
12. Ciara Linnane, China's Dominance in Fintech Extends to Its "Unicorns," MARKETWATCH
(Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-dominance-in-fintech-extends-to-its-
unicorns-2016-09-09 [https://perma.cclNK5B-9MKB]. See generally Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating
Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583 (2016) (discussing
"unicorns" and the regulations applied to them).
13. See Telis Demos, What's Fintech? Nasdaq and KBW Offer an Answer with a New Index,
WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2016), https://www.wsj.comlarticles/whats-fintech-nasdaq-and-kbw-offer-an-
answer-with-a-new-index-1468950444 [https://perma.cc/LW73-HV48] ("[E]xchange operator
Nasdaq Inc. a day ago unveiled the KBW Nasdaq Financial Technology Index, or KFTX.").
14. See Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 655-
56 (2015) (arguing that "[t]his type of substitutive disintermediation is more superficial than
substantive in nature" because "while [fintech] companies like Wealthfront have replaced human
money managers with algorithmic programs, they have simply substituted a human intermediary
with a computerized one"); Leslie Picker, "Fintech" Loses Some of Its Attraction for Investors, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBoOK (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/fintech-
loses-some-of-its-attraction-for-investors.html [https://perma.cc/A4P7-L3NC] (noting that "[e]ven
industry leaders are divided over what separates a fintech company from a plain old financial
services company that uses technology"). But see Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the
Innovation Trilemma, 106 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=3054770## [https://perma.cc/8RTH-T73W] (arguing that fintech's
financial innovations are different in a number of significant ways from previous iterations of
financial innovation).
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that agglomerates a number of distinct phenomena into one catchy, but
underspecified, term.15
In order to avoid these difficulties, this Article will use the term
"fintech" to refer to the new breed of companies that specialize in
providing financial services primarily through technologically enabled
mobile and online platforms. 16 Importantly, this definition
distinguishes the current fintech revolution from previous technological
innovations in finance. Unlike earlier generations of finance-related
technology, which typically focused on providing services to already-
established financial firms, today's fintech companies are increasingly
providing services directly to consumers. 17 As this Part will
demonstrate, fintech is changing finance in fundamental ways, from
investment management to capital raising to the very form of currency
itself. In each of these areas, fintech innovation has lowered the barriers
to entry, expanded access to financial services, and challenged
traditional understandings about how finance works.18
15. See Nick Ismail, Is FinTech Really a Game Changer?, INFO. AGE (Sept. 7, 2016),
http://www.information-age.com/fintech-really-game-changer- 123461993/ [https://perma.cc/
MM7A-WIU5G] (characterizing the term "FinTech" as a "largely unhelpful buzzword").
16. For a sampling of alternative definitions of fintech, see Nat'l Econ. Council, A Framework
for FinTech, WHITE HOUSE 2 (Jan. 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files/documents/A%20Framework%20for%2OFinTech%20 FINAL
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MF8-XWXP] (defining fintech as a "wide spectrum of technological
innovations which impact a broad range of financial activities, including payments, investment
management, capital raising, deposits and lending, insurance, regulatory compliance, and other
activities in the financial services space"); Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal
Banking System: An OCC Perspective, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (Mar. 2016),
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-
responsible-innovation-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf [https://perma.ccV6AT-F9PD]
(defining "fintech" as simply "financial technology"); and THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
ECONOMIST, THE DISRUPTION OF BANKING 2 n.2 (2015), https://www.eiuperspectives
.economist.com/sites/default/files/EIU-The%20disruption%20f%20bankingPDF_0.pdf
[https://perma.cclP63L-EBAL] (defining fintech as "new entrants that use Internet-based and
mobile technologies to create new or superior banking products"). While most fintech companies
focus on a particular slice of the fintech industry, some have attempted to expand into offering
broader financial services. See Selina Wang & Julie Verhage, SoFi Buys Teams from Mortgage
Startup Clara to Boost Offerings, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-01-26/sofi-buys-teams-from-mortgage-startup-clara-to-boost-offerings
[https://perma.cc/C7RH-FU2V].
17. See Liz Moyer, From Wall Street Banking, a New Wav4ofFintech Investors, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/from-wall-
street-banking-a-new-wave-of-fintech-investors.html [https://perma.cc/FRM3-GR8S].
18. In response to these challengers, some traditional banks have attempted to acquire
fintech companies or develop them in-house. In 2016, for example, Goldman Sachs acquired Honest
Dollar, an online retirement savings start-up, while JPMorgan created a program to "adopt"
fintech start-ups, allowing them access to JPMorgan's facilities and expertise. See Melissa
Mittelman, JPMorgan to Adopt Fintech Startups with In-House Incubator, BLOOMBERG (June 30,
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-30/jpmorgan-to-adopt-fintech-startups-
with-in-house-incubator [https://perma.cc/24N4-HVET] (explaining JPMorgan's "adoption" plan);
Anne Tergesen & Peter Rudegeair, Goldman Sachs Buys Online Retirement Benefits Business,
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A. Asset Management
One area of finance in which fintech has made substantial
headway is asset management. 19 The process of advising investors and
managing investments has long been a lucrative one: profit margins in
the asset management industry were 39% in 2014.20 But it has also
been a problematic one.21 In recent years, the asset management
industry has been sharply criticized for its endemic conflicts of
interest,22 opaque fee structure, 23 and poor performance. 24 Indeed, after
the financial crisis, the Securities and Exchange Commission set up a
separate asset management unit to increase monitoring of the
industry's practices, a sign of the perceived magnitude of the problems
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.wsj.comlarticles/goldman-sachs-buys-online-retirement-
benefits-business-1457975369 [https://perma.cc/GP79-R5Z8] (discussing Goldman Sachs'
acquisition of Honest Dollar). For an analysis of the reasons for these developments and the efforts
by established institutions to commandeer fintech companies, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T.
Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017).
19. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 573-74 (2014)
(describing the use of artificial intelligence and computerization in the asset management
industry).
20. See The Tide Turns - Asset Managers, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21695552-consumers-are-finally-
revolting-against-outdated-industry-tide-turns [https://perma.cc/N2GJ-BNM2] (detailing asset
manager profit margins).
21. See Harvey Bines & Steve Thel, The Varieties of Investment Management Law, 21
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 71, 77 (2016) (discussing the problems created by institutional trusts);
Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge Fund Mangers' Conflicts of
Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251 (2009) (detailing the negative effects that conflicts of interest
in the hedge fund industry can have on investors).
22. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisers
Act After Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405, 417 (2016) (discussing the
difficulties created by conflicts of interest); Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-
Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701 (2010) (explaining the restrictions placed
on investment advisors aimed at preventing conflicts of interest); Edward B. Rock, Foxes and Hen
Houses?: Personal Trading by Mutual Fund Managers, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1601, 1615-16 (1995)
(detailing conflicts of interest facing fund managers).
23. In recent years, the SEC has fined a number of large asset managers for improper fee
practices. The wrongdoers include such prominent firms as Apollo, Blackstone, and KKR. See Lisa
Beilfuss & Aruna Viswanatha, Blackstone in $39 Million SEC Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7,
2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackstone-settles-with-sec-over-certain-fee-practices-
1444238653 [https://perma.ccLJZ4-E4DG]; Mark Maremont, KKR Agrees to $30 Million SEC
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kkr-settles-with-sec-for-
nearly-30-million-1435592880 [https://perma.cc/CT97-DMGK]; Ben Protess, Apollo Global Settles
Securities Case as S.E.C. Issues $53 Million Fine, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/business/dealbook/apollo-global-settles-securities-case-as-
sec-issues-53-million-fine.html [https://perma.cclBH2C-9YVH].
24. See Madison Marriage, 86% of Active Equity Funds Underperform, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 20,
2016), https://www.ft.com/contentle555d83a-ed28-11e5-888e-2eadd5fbc4a4 [https://perma.cc/
4FKY-9T9G]; Chris Newlands & Madison Marriage, 99% of Actively Managed US Equity Funds
Underperform, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/el39d940-977d-1le6-alde-
bdf38d484582 [https://perma.cclJSL7-U3DW].
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plaguing the sector. 25 The Financial Stability Oversight Council has
recently stated that it is concerned about potential systemic risks
mounting in the asset management industry.26
In the face of these problems, a number of start-up fintech
companies have entered into the field with technology-based solutions
to compete with traditional asset managers.27 These robo-advisor
companies provide a set of wealth management services entirely online
and largely based on data-driven, algorithmic approaches to
investment. 28 Companies such as Betterment, Wealthfront, and Folio,
for example, promise to improve portfolio returns for regular investors
saving for retirement, college, or other major events through a variety
of automated investment strategies. The strategies are derived from
inputs received from users about their sensitivity to risk, investment
horizon, and current investments. These companies generally have no
brick-and-mortar locations and instead funnel all interactions through
their online sites. 29 They often have well-developed and fully integrated
mobile applications to deliver services and advice. 30 They communicate
25. See Amy B.R. Lancellotta, Paulita A. Pike & Paul Schott Stevens, Fund Governance: A
Successful, Evolving Model, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 455, 485 (2016) (discussing the SEC's Asset
Management Unit); Landon Thomas Jr., A New Focus on Liquidity After a Fund's Collapse, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBoOK (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/business/dealbookla-new-
focus-on-liquidity-after-a-funds-collapse.html [https://perma.cc/4CHJ-R3F6] ("In 2010, the S.E.C.,
the main regulator for mutual funds, set up an asset management unit with the aim of increasing
surveillance of fund companies.").
26. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC%202016%2OAnnual
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JJ7-M38G] ("The asset management industry's increasing
significance to financial markets and to the broader economy underscores the need for the
Council's consideration of potential risks to U.S. financial stability from products and activities in
this sector.").
27. See Lin, supra note 14, at 653-54 ("Automated money management companies, like
Wealthfront, have billions of dollars under management and are fundamentally changing the
wealth management business once dominated by financial advisors.").
28. These services have recently been the subject of intense regulatory scrutiny. The
Massachusetts securities regulator even announced that automated robo-advisors "may be
inherently unable to carry out the fiduciary obligations of a state-registered investment adviser."
Mass. Sec. Div., Policy Statement: Robo-Advisers and State Investment Adviser Registration,
SECRETARY COMMONWEALTH MASS. 1 (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.sec.state.ma.us/set/sctpdflpolicy-
statement- -robo-advisers-and-state-investment-adviser-registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KGW-
64PW]. Thus, robo-advisors face a number of challenges in surmounting political opposition to
their growth.
29. See Leena Rao, Wealthfront's Leader on Investment Fees, Millenials, and the Competition,
FORTUNE (Aug. 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/2015/08/06/wealthfront-investing-qal
[https://perma.cc/QH7M-P6QN] (explaining that Wealthfront has "focused on providing a
completely automated investment service, eliminating the cost of retail locations and sales
teams").
30. See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social Netbanks:
Are You Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211 (2016) (discussing the use of digital
platforms by fintech start-ups).
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with customers through blogs and emails, rather than personal
relationships. 3 1 The success of robo-advisors has led to an explosion of
new entrants into the market, with hundreds of companies now active
in the field, many of them start-ups. 32
Robo-advisors have pioneered a number of digital innovations
aimed at responding to legal incentives in the financial marketplace.
One example is their aggressive use of "tax loss harvesting"
techniques. 33 Tax loss harvesting refers to the practice of lowering a
taxpayer's taxable income by selectively selling investments that have
suffered capital losses, while holding onto investments that have seen
capital gains. 34 The technique is not without controversy, as several
commentators have pointed out that it allows individuals to "cherry
pick" the timing of sales to make a winning portfolio look like a losing
one in the eyes of the IRS. 3 5 Despite the controversy, tax loss harvesting
is widely viewed as legal under current regulations, and fintech firms
have taken great advantage of the practice. 36 Fintech has a comparative
advantage over human advisors in this area, as optimal tax loss
harvesting requires an advisor to closely and continuously monitor the
performance of investments, something that only computer software
can realistically achieve in today's market. 3 One fintech firm estimates
that the advantage of performing tax loss harvesting on a daily basis,
rather than an annual one (as is more common in traditional firms),
generates tax benefits that are twice as large. 38
31. See Michael Blanding, Why Millenials Flock to Fintech for Personal Investing, FORBES
(Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2016/12/07/why-millennials-
flock-to-fmtech-for-personal-investing/ [https://perma.cc/JAT3-64VF].
32. See Robert McGarvey, Robo-Advisors Are on the Rise, STREET (Apr. 3, 2016),
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13515631/1/robo-advisors-are-on-the-rise.html [https://perma.cc/
EZ78-QC56].
33. See PAOLO SIRONI, FINTECH INNOVATION: FROM ROBO-ADVISORS To GOAL BASED
INVESTING AND GAMIFICATION 33-36 (2016) (discussing the principles of "tax-loss harvesting").
34. See Eric D. Chason, Taxing Losers, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 541, 543-45 (2016).
35. See id. at 543 ('Taxpayers should not be able to 'cherry pick' loss elements out of an overall
winning portfolio."); Yoseph M. Edrey, What Are Capital Gains and Losses Anyway?, 24 VA. TAX
REV. 141, 171 (2004) ("This creates what is called the 'cherry-picking' problem: the taxpayer will
be able to choose a convenient date to dispose of the asset and realize a loss that will offset regular
taxable income."); Robert H. Scarborough, Risk, Diversification and the Design of Loss Limitations
Under a Realization-Based Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 677, 680-81 (1993) ("It is widely agreed
that the principal justification for limiting capital losses is to prevent selective realization, or
cherrypicking,' of losses by taxpayers who have unrealized gains.").
36. See Blanding, supra note 31.
37. See Wealthfront Tax-Loss Harvesting White Paper, WEALTHFRONT,
https://research.wealthfront.com/whitepapers/tax-loss-harvesting/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/GW35-SNC7] (explaining that daily tax loss harvesting "could result in
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Through their use of robo-advising, fintech firms have been able
to dramatically lower costs in the industry. While traditional wealth
management firms charge clients a fee of 1% or more of the assets being
managed, robo-advisors can charge between .15% and .35%.39 Given the
close correlation between lower fees and higher returns, investors have
started to shift toward these sorts of low-fee financial services. 40
Increased competition in the industry has put pressure on traditional
investment managers to lower their fees as well.41
In addition to lowering costs, fintech firms have greatly
expanded consumer access to sophisticated wealth management
services. Many large banks that offer wealth management services
require potential clients to invest $1 million or more in assets before
they will consider taking them on as clients. 42 Fintech start-ups, on the
other hand, require significantly less from their clients, with some firms
eliminating minimum investment requirements entirely.43 This
distinction has allowed fintech firms to reach a set of consumers that
have traditionally been overlooked by the investment management
industry.44
39. Andrea Coombes, How to Get Investment Advice for Less Online, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4,
2013), https://www.wsj.comlarticles/how-to-get-investment-advice-for-less-online-1378324912
[https://perma.cclGM88-LY7J].
40. See Index We Trust - Asset Management, EcONOMIST (June 11, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21700401-vanguard-has-radically-
changed-money-management-being-boring-and-cheap-index-we [https:/perma.cc/ZW8Z-SHK8].
41. See Irving Wladawsky-Berger, Is FinTech Forcing Banking to a Tipping Point?, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 15, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/04/15/is-fintech-forcing-banking-to-a-tipping-
point/ [https://perma.cc/F6EC-GUH8] ("[I]ncreased competition from FinTech startups [is] putting
huge pressure on banks ... to embrace many of the FinTech innovations introduced by
startups . . . ."). In addition, some firms have decided to adopt the strategies of robo-advisor firms.
BlackRock, for example, recently laid out plans to fold a number of its actively managed funds into
funds based on algorithmic trading. See Landon Thomas Jr., At BlackRock, Machines Are Rising
over Managers to Pick Stocks, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/28/business/dealbook/blackrock-actively-managed-funds-computer-models.html
[https://perma.cc/2GUY-354Q] (detailing BlackRock's "plan to consolidate a large number of
actively managed mutual funds with peers that rely more on algorithms and models to pick
stocks").
42. See Robo-Advisory in Wealth Management, DELOITTE 1 (Oct. 2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/financial-services/RoboNo_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CK48-GZ3K] ("On average, a potential client needs to have somewhere between
one and five million euros in liquid assets to be within the scope of a Wealth Manager's target
client group.").
43. See John Divine, How Will Robo Advisors Impact the Future of Investing?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 29, 2016, 9:21 AM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/2016-09-
29/how-will-robo-advisors-impact-the-future-of-investing [https://perma.cc/FRR3-AUCR] ("Some
robo advisors, by contrast, don't even have minimum buy-ins.... Just hand over your money, tell
the robots a little bit about your risk tolerance and goals and leave the rest to the algorithm.").
44. See Barbara Novick et. al., Digital Investment Advice: Robo Advisors Come of Age,




Fintech is also working tremendous change in another of
finance's essential roles: raising capital. Deciding which companies and
individuals receive loans and investments to help them grow and
prosper has always been a core function of the financial industry.
Efficient allocation of capital ensures that markets function properly,
directing money and resources to the businesses and entrepreneurs
that are most deserving. 45 For this reason, the power to control the
allocation process itself has fundamental consequences for the wider
economy. 4 6 The process has traditionally been dominated by large
banks; they are the only ones with the financial capacity and the market
knowledge to adequately handle large debt issuances, initial public
offerings, and the like.4 7 This is what led Lloyd Blankfein, the former
head of Goldman Sachs, to conclude, in the period just months after the
global financial crisis, that investment banks were "doing God's
work." 48
Fintech, however, has started to disrupt the business of raising
capital. It has broken the monopoly that banks have had over both debt
and equity financing and pioneered new ways for consumers and
businesses to access capital. In doing so, fintech companies have made
advisors may provide an effective way to engage consumers who have not considered using
traditional investment management services or who have been discouraged by the costs associated
with obtaining personalized investment advice.").
45. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Jack Hirshleifer, Efficient Allocation
of Capital in an Uncertain World, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 77 (1964).
46. See Franklin Allen, Stock Markets and Resource Allocation, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 81, 95-97 (Colin Mayer & Xavier Vives eds., 1993) (explaining the
relationship between market valuation and resource allocation); see also Jeffrey Wurgler,
Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (2000) (exploring
international differences in the efficiency of capital allocation).
47. See Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1517, 1543-47 (2013) (analyzing the
effects of concentration in commercial and investment banking); Randall S. Thomas, Stewart J.
Schwab & Robert G. Hansen, Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115, 180-86 (2001) (describing the
increasing market power in debt offerings and initial public offerings of a few investment banks);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 251-54 (describing the
relentless process of consolidation in the banking industry in recent decades). The domination of
investment banks in this field was reduced, though not eliminated, in 1999 when the Glass-
Steagall Act was repealed and commercial banks were allowed to enter the underwriting markets.
See Charles K Whitehead, Size Matters: Commercial Banks and the Capital Markets, 76 OHIO ST.
L.J. 765, 800-03 (2015).
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fundamental changes in the way that capital is allocated in the market,
simultaneously lowering costs and broadening access to new
constituencies.
The primary innovation that fintech has engineered in capital
raising is the pioneering of crowdfunding. 49 Crowdfunding generally
refers to the phenomenon of early-stage companies raising money from
large groups of people through the internet, often aided by social
networks and viral media campaigns.50 Crowdfunding companies have
broken new ground in equity raising, debt financing, and other areas.
As a result, the sector has seen tremendous growth in recent years.
Crowdfunding companies raised $16.2 billion in 2014,51 and the World
Bank predicts that the industry could grow to $96 billion by 2025.52
In equity, the traditional route for start-up companies to raise
large amounts of capital from investors was through initial public
offerings or venture capital firms.53 Both of these routes were expensive
and generally tended to limit the field of initial investors to large
institutional investors or very wealthy individuals. 54 But a number of
fintech companies have started to change the way that start-up
companies seeking capital connect with people seeking investments.
Through the proliferation of online crowdfunding companies such as
49. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 10-29 (explaining what crowdfunding is, the types of crowdfunding, and the
merging of crowdsourcing and microfinance); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the
Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 477-81 (2014)
(outlining the origination and expansion of crowdfunding and the resulting application of U.S.
securities law); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 880-85 (2011) (introducing
the history of crowdfunding as it relates to federal securities regulation); Joan MacLeod
Heminway, What is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J.
335, 356-61 (2012) (explaining the models of crowdfunding and crowdfunded business interests at
the margin); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339 (2013) ("'[C]rowd-funding' and
other kinds of small business capital raising, gained political traction in Congress as well as in the
White House.").
50. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 49, at 881.
51. Global Crowdfunding, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.economist.com/
news/economic-and-financial-indicators/21647603-global-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/RDJ3-
WM3P].
52. JASON BEST, SHERWOOD NEISS & RICHARD SWART, WORLD BANK, CROWDFUNDING'S
POTENTIAL FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD 43 (2013), https://www.infodev.org/infodev-
files/wbcrowdfundingreport-v12.pdf [https://perma.ccl276T-4SF5].
53. See JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS,
RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS § 1.1 (2d ed. 2018).
54. See Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 221 (noting that "[tihe most optimistic commentators hope that
crowdfunding eases access to capital markets for promising for-profit ventures, creating a new step
in the life cycle of a startup: friends and family funding, crowdfunding, angel investing, venture
capital . . ., and then IPO").
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AngelList and FundersClub, early stage companies can reach
significantly broader audiences. FundersClub, for example, facilitates
the pooling of capital from large groups of investors through its website,
thus allowing smaller investors to purchase equity stakes in start-ups
without the large minimum investments typically required by venture
capital funds.55 Equity crowdfunding sites facilitate transactions that
are entirely online, and the fintech companies merely serve as
intermediaries in the exchange. The industry has been buoyed by the
passage of new regulations designed to encourage crowdfunding.5 6 The
proliferation of these sorts of equity crowdfunding sites suggests an
enduring expansion of potential sources of funds for start-ups.57
Fintech has also made significant headway in debt financing,
both for businesses and for individuals. Loans to small businesses have
always been an uncertain and costly sector of the market, and many
banks have cut back on them after the financial crisis.58 But fintech has
stepped into the void with a number of innovations, perhaps most
importantly in peer-to-peer lending.59 Firms such as Prosper and
55. Most venture capital funds require minimum investments of between $50,000 and
$250,000 to participate in their offerings, while FundersClub investors can make investments as
small as $3,000. Ryan Westwood, Startup Investing Could Get a Lot More Angels, FORBES 2 (Oct.
28, 2015, 3:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanwestwood/2015/10/28/startup-investing-
could-get-a-lot-more-angels/2/#538cbb486del [https://perma.cclV6AM-UCBN]. AngelList has an
even lower minimum investment of $1,000. Investing on AngelList, ANGELLIST,
https://angel.co/invest/start (last visited Mar. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/22JX-TK5V].
56. The JOBS Act of 2012 included new exemptions for certain crowdfunding transactions.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315
(2012). The Act has come under some criticism, however, for not going far enough to allow greater
access to crowdfunding. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment
Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments That Begs
for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865, 880-85 (2014) (arguing that the Act imposed significant
costs on crowdfunding in excess of the expected benefits); Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The
Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 284 (2014) (arguing that retail
crowdfunding is "not viable" under the JOBS Act).
57. One large crowdfunding site, Indiegogo, entered the equity crowdfunding space in
November 2016 and, by December, had already raised $575,000 in equity funds. Tess Murphy,
Equity Crowdfunding: 4 Weeks In, $575k+ Raised, INDIEGOGO (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://go.indiegogo.com/blog/2016/12/equity-crowdfunding-success.html [https://perma.cc/HHN8-
3JBK]. And crowdfunding is expanding the pool of potential investors; a 2015 study by the UK's
Financial Conduct Authority found that 62% of investors in crowdfunding sites had no prior
investment experience. A Review of the Regulatory Regime for Crowdfunding and the Promotion
of Non-readily Realisable Securities by Other Media, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY 5 (Feb. 2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/thematic-reviews/crowdfunding-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2CLY-C7SH].
58. See Crowdfunding: Cool, Man, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://www.economist.com/
news/special-report/21650291 -where-small-businesses-can-borrow-if-banks-turn-them-down-cool-
man [https://perma.ccVGU6-RAEE] ("But what bankers would surely have disdained, the public
seized with gusto . . . .").
59. For an analysis of the regulatory status of peer-to-peer lending, see Andrew Verstein, The
Misregulation of Person-to-Person Leading, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445 (2011).
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Lending Club, instead of providing loans themselves, connect
companies and individuals who need money to regular individuals,
rather than traditional financial institutions, who are willing to loan
them that money. 60 Funding Circle, another firm active in this market,
calls itself "the bond market for small companies." 61 Debt crowdfunding
companies have introduced a number of innovations to support the
industry, including such practices as using big data to more accurately
assess the risk of loans, mobile applications and online platforms to
streamline and clarify loan management and terms, and automated
investing platforms to allow investors to automatically purchase loans
within certain risk ratios. 62
Peer-to-peer lending companies have also helped drive down the
cost of borrowing for consumers. Just to name a few examples, fintech
companies have entered the student loan market, 63 the auto loan
market,64 and the home mortgage market, 65 in each case lowering costs
by reducing the difficulty of connecting investors with borrowers. In the
student loan market, one major player, SoFi, has focused on connecting
alumni from particular schools with current students at those schools,
under the belief that the alumni have a better sense of the potential
risks and rewards of the investment.66 While the strategies in each of
these markets differ, all of these consumer-facing fintech companies
promise lower interest rates for borrowers, and better returns for
individual investors, by utilizing technology and online networks to cut
out costs.
Finally, beyond equity and debt crowdfunding, fintech
companies have also demonstrated that companies can raise capital in
other, more creative ways. At a number of fintech sites, companies
seeking to raise capital can reward early investors, not with shares or
60. Moyer, supra note 17.
61. Crowdfunding: Cool, Man, supra note 58.
62. See Frequently Asked Questions, FUNDING CIRCLE, https://www.fundingcircle.coml
us/invest/faq/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cclKB22-7Z9D] (detailing such
innovations as provided by online marketplace Funding Circle).
63. See Robert Farrington, The Rise of Peer to Peer Student Loans, FORBES 1 (Aug. 13, 2014,
8:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sitqs/robertfarrington/2014/08/13/the-rise-of-peer-to-peer-
student-loans/#289557b34edb [https://perma.c/F4JJ-7G52].
64. See Car Loans: New Engine, ECONOMIST (May 7, 2016), https://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/21698276-fintech-firms-find-way-finance-purchases-secondhand-
cars-new-engine [https://perma.cc/4268-UPJ2].
65. See Ben McLannahan, Fintech Start-Ups Look to Build on US Mortgage Market Share,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e83f9a78-blbc-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0
[https://perma.cclX8ZB-RSJL].
66. Peter Rudegeair & Telis Demos, Slump Might Turn Anti-bank SoFi into a Bank, WALL




bonds, but with products or services.67 Companies such as Kickstarter
and Indiegogo, for example, allow companies to raise money from the
public for various projects, primarily in the technology and media
sectors, and in return, their "backers" receive "rewards" such as early
prototypes of the products or free t-shirts and tote bags.68 Similarly, a
number of new ventures have raised funds for research and
development through "initial coin offerings," under which investors buy
digital tokens that they hope will eventually entitle them to use the
services generated by the venture. 69 The popularity of these sorts of
crowdfunding sites has made it far easier and less expensive for early
stage companies to raise funds for expansion and product development.
These sites have also allowed small businesses that might not have
received the support of traditional banks to access capital.
Thus, crowdfunding is revolutionizing the process of capital
raising. Crowdfunding sites are reducing costs, tapping new markets,
and utilizing technology and big data to compete with traditional
players. Many are operating in areas that suffer from market failures,
such as the auto loan market where moral hazard and lack of
information inhibit efficient transactions. Fintech has sought out and
identified these areas and has attempted to eliminate the market
failures. In essence, fintech's aim is to reduce transaction costs in order
to improve capital allocation in a wide range of markets. They have
demonstrated that alternative sources of financing are not as difficult
to find as they once were.
C. Virtual Currency
In addition to asset management and crowdfunding, fintech has
also innovated in an even more fundamental facet of finance-that is,
the structure of currency itself. It is hard to imagine a more essential
67. Perhaps the most infamous case is that of Oculus Rift. In 2012, Oculus raised $2.5 million
from investors through the crowdfunding site Kickstarter. The money was used to develop the
Oculus Rift virtual reality headset. In return, Oculus promised to give the headsets to the investors
if and when they were produced. The investors, notably, did not receive equity interests in the
company. Two years later, in 2014, Oculus was sold to Facebook for $2 billion. Christopher Mims,
Tech Startup Crowdfunding Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2015),
https://www.wsj.comlarticles/tech-startup-crowdfunding-isnt-all-its-cracked-up-to-be-14 4 9 4 6 4 4 6 0
[https://perma.cc/JC3S-8AUA].
68. Carol Benovic & Sid Orlando, Need Some Reward Ideas? Here Are 96 of Them,
KICKSTARTER BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/need-some-reward-ideas-
here-are-96-of-them [https://perma.cc/2GL2-BE5Z].
69. See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin
Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies
Research, Working Paper No. 338, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=3048104 [https://perma.cc/X5WY-W2F7].
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underpinning of the modern economy than money. As Niall Ferguson
has put it, "the ascent of money has been essential to the ascent of
man."7 0 Until now, the process of creating and distributing currency has
been the province of governments.7 1 Fintech is starting to challenge
that system, primarily through the invention of "virtual currencies." 72
Virtual currency refers generally to digital money that is
electronically created and stored but that lacks the status of legal
tender backed by government authority.73 The rise of virtual currency
is in a sense the culmination of a larger and longer process of the steady
decentralization of control over money supplies.74 When money could
only change hands through coins minted by the government, the
government had exclusive control over the means and value of
exchanges. Money served a primarily public function: if governments
wished to mint more coins or to debase their currencies, they had the
power to do so. 75 But once banks allowed people to deposit money into
their reserves and simultaneously loaned that money out to borrowers,
money could be "created" by the private sector.76 With the proliferation
of credit and debit cards, money can be exchanged without ever using
the hard currency that governments print and mint.77 So, in a sense,
money has been virtual and digital for some time.
The primary innovation of fintech in recent years, however, has
been to remove government currencies from the process entirely. It has
done so by utilizing decentralized, peer-to-peer networks enabled
70. NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 2 (2008).
71. Id. at 23-24. An important exception can be found in the private bank notes issued during
the so-called Free Banking Era in the United States from 1837 to 1863, during which individual
banks would print notes that entitled holders to payment from the bank in gold or silver. See HUGH
ROCKOFF, THE FREE BANKING ERA: A REEXAMINATION (1975).
72. See Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized
Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 199-202 (2016)
(explaining the potentially broad applications of decentralized ledger technology, including
Bitcoin); Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the
Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 277-96 (2015) (detailing Bitcoin and other virtual currencies
and their rise to prominence).
73. Tu & Meredith, supra note 72, at 278; see Virtual Currency Schemes, EUR. CENT. BANK
13-19 (Oct. 2012), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes20l210en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z2XN-XEV4] (defining and categorizing virtual currency schemes).
74. CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM
25 (2014); Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 376-
79 (2016); Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 73, at 41-52.
75. Levitin, supra note 74, at 376-77.
76. Id. at 377.
77. See Julia Gladstone, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Introduction, 53 BUS. LAW. 217,
221 (1997) ("Secure Electronic Transactions ... [have] made credit card transactions on the
Internet secure and, as a result, cashless and credit sales on the Internet are burgeoning.").
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through a public ledger known as the "blockchain."78 While a
comprehensive analysis of the technology underlying virtual currency
is beyond the scope of this Article,79 a few key features should be
highlighted.
First, transactions in virtual currency are recorded on a publicly
available ledger, or blockchain, rather than routed through financial
institutions.80 This ledger, which amounts to a log of all previous
transactions, is continuously downloaded by users, thereby
authenticating and confirming each transaction as it happens.,, The
distributed and consensual nature of the networks gives users greater
confidence that fraudulent transactions will be identified and
prevented. The network itself is used to monitor and verify currency
creation and transfer.82
Second, new currency is created through a process called
"mining." 83 Users that provide computer power to process virtual
currency transactions are rewarded with virtual currency for their
services to the network. 84 This creates an incentive for users to
contribute to the proper functioning of the currency.
Third, virtual currency exchanges have sprung up to allow
parties to buy and sell virtual currencies.85 These exchanges contribute
to establishing the value of the currencies by providing a readily
available way to exchange virtual currency for other currencies, such as
78. The importance of blockchain extends beyond just virtual currencies. The technology is
being used in a variety of different contexts, from bank trading to real estate government services.
See, e.g., Telis Demos, J.P. Morgan Has a New Twist on Blockchain, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2016, 8:51
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-has-a-new-twist-on-blockchain-1475537138
[https://perma.ccB7VQ-GSKA]; Nikhil Lohade, Dubai Aims to Be a City Built on Blockchain,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2017, 10:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dubai-aims-to-be-a-city-built-
on-blockchain- 1493086080 [https://perma.cc/26A6-KNFY]; Governments May Be Big Backers of the
Blockchain, ECONOMIST (June 1, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21722869-anti-
establishment-technology-faces-ironic-turn-fortune-governments-may-be-big-backers
[https://perma.cc/47RK-QWU6].
79. For a survey of the technology underlying blockchain and virtual currencies, see Jesse
Yli-Huumo, Deokyoon Ko, Sujin Choi, Sooyong Park & Kari Smolander, Where Is Current Research
on Blockchain Technology?-A Systematic Review, PLOS ONE (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0163477 [https://perma.cc/54PP-
BVC2].
80. Reyes, supra note 72, at 197.
81. Id. at 197-99.
82. The Economist Explains: How Does Bitcoin Work?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2013),
http://www.economist.comlbitcoinexplained [https://perma.cc/KK5R-9PEL].
83. Tu & Meredith, supra note 72, at 283.
84. PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND
EcONOMIcs 106 (2015).
85. See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the
Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 111, 121-23 (2012) (explaining Bitcoin
exchanges).
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dollars or euros.86 As will be discussed further below, because of their
centrality to the system, these exchanges have become the target of
hackers, resulting in several high-profile attacks.87
Finally, virtual currencies provide varying degrees of
confidentiality for the parties engaged in transactions. Bitcoin, for
example, does not transmit personal information about the identity of
owners, thereby providing a degree of privacy, but actual transactions
in the currency are publicly available.88 Other currencies obscure even
more information, including information about past transactions.89
Several virtual currencies have now emerged, and it is becoming
increasingly clear that these currencies will serve different purposes
and different markets. Bitcoin is perhaps the most well-known virtual
currency. Launched in 2009, it is now widely used in virtual
transactions, with trading volumes currently reaching $30 million a day
in the United States alone, and even greater volumes in China and
Japan.90 Although the Securities and Exchange Commission recently
rejected a request to create an exchange-traded fund based on Bitcoin,
other regulators have been more open to its development.91 Another
virtual currency, Ethereum, was created in 2015 and has already
gained a significant following, at least partially due to its built-in tools
for creating "smart contracts." 92 Smart contracts are contracts that
86. See Matthew Kien-Meng Ly, Coining Bitcoin's 'Legal-Bits"- Examining the Regulatory
Framework for Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 587, 592 (2014) (explaining
this concept as related to bitcoins).
87. See e.g., Yuji Nakamura, The Wretched, Endless Cycle ofBitcoin Hacks, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
17, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-17/the-wretched-endless-cycle-of-
bitcoin-hacks [https://perma.cc/327G-6TAA].
88. Known Unknown, ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-
and-economics/21709329-another-crypto-currency-born-known-unknown [https://perma.cclY7D4-
DWDD].
89. See id. (describing how Zeash, a virtual currency, uses a cryptographic technique known
as "zero-knowledge proofs" to prevent any information about a transaction other than its validity
from being available).
90. See Rob Curran, As Bitcoin ETF Nears, Analysts Warn of Trading Frenzy, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 5, 2017, 10:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/irrational-exuberance-for-bitcoin-etfs-
1486350601 [https://perma.cc/F8TL-SP9J] (discussing the financial implications of the virtual
currency).
91. See Alexander Osipovich, The Future of Bitcoin Could Be Bitcoin Futures, WALL ST. J.:
MONEYBEAT (Mar. 28, 2017, 3:26 PM), https://blogs.wsj.comlmoneybeat/2017/03/28/the-future-of-
bitcoin-could-be-bitcoin-futures/ [https://perma.cc/7VKV-SWYH] (stating that the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, among others, is open to the introduction of Bitcoin futures);
Nathaniel Popper, S.E.C. Rejects Winklevoss Brothers' Bid to Create Bitcoin E.T.F., N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/business/dealbook/winkelvoss-
brothers-bid-to-create-a-bitcoin-etf-is-rejected.html [https://perma.cc/P99H-9C9H] (noting the
unregulated nature of Bitcoin markets).
92. See Paul Vigna, Bitcoin Rival Ethereum Gains Traction, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2016, 11:28
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-rival-ether-gains-traction-1466461279 [https://perma
.cclWW55-DB2B] (noting that Ethereum "has become the next hot thing in cryptocurrencies").
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automatically enforce their provisions through computer algorithms,
rather than relying on unpredictable courts. 93 So, for example, a smart
bond contract could provide that, on certain dates, interest and
principal payments would automatically be sent to the creditor,
triggered solely by the functioning of the algorithm. A network of such
smart contracts could potentially replicate many of the features of a
corporation, and indeed, some programmers have attempted to do so.94
Yet another virtual currency, Zcash, promises complete confidentiality,
specifically guaranteeing that no information about the parties or even
the transaction itself will leak to third parties. 95
The explosion of virtual currencies in recent years has drawn
attention from regulators, who have concerns about the systemic
implications of virtual currencies on the wider economy. But regardless
of the eventual response of regulators to virtual currency, fintech has
already demonstrated the feasibility of decentralized, peer-to-peer
online networks to disrupt fundamental features of the financial
system, in this case currency itself. It suggests that fintech will continue
to challenge many of the assumptions about the respective roles of
banks, governments, and individuals in finance.
II. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SYSTEMIC RISK
Fintech has ushered in a wave of innovation and change in the
financial industry. These changes have affected nearly every sector of
finance, from asset management to capital raising to the form of money
itself. By increasing competition and lowering prices, fintech promises
to provide great benefits to society at large. But the changes also call
for a broad reassessment of the adequacy of current financial
regulation. In particular, fintech raises questions about one unique
feature of financial regulation-its focus on systemic risk. In order to
understand the potential implications of fintech for systemic risk, we
must first analyze the structure and rationale of current regulations
aimed at reducing the likelihood that shocks in the financial industry
will lead to broader and deeper collapses in the economy as a whole.
93. See Reyes, supra note 72, at 201 ("Smart contracts can be thought of as self-executing
transactions, or as 'automated programs that transfer digital assets within the block-chain upon
certain triggering conditions. . . .'"(alteration in original) (quoting Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart
Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 38 (2014))).
94. See Not-So-Clever Contracts, ECONOMIST (July 28, 2016), https://www.economist.com/
news/business/21702758-time-being-least-human-judgment-still-better-bet-cold-hearted
[https://perma.ccl9SSR-2GLP].




While the financial system has grown in size and complexity
over the years, its core purpose has always been a simple one: to
mediate between suppliers of capital and users of capital. 96 The efficient
allocation of capital is central to the functioning of modern-day
economies, and the health of the financial system is closely correlated
with economic growth more generally. 97 But like all markets, the
financial system does not always function properly. Individual financial
institutions pursuing their own private interests sometimes impose
costs on the public, perhaps as a result of the underproduction of public
goods or the lack of relevant information or the development of
monopolies. In these instances, governments have an interest in
intervening to correct the inefficient behavior.98 Financial regulation,
thus, aims to improve the functioning of the financial system by, among
other things, correcting market failures, limiting externalities, and
protecting vulnerable parties. 99
Given the centrality of the financial sector to economic growth,
it is perhaps unsurprising that financial regulation has long been
distinguished by its particular focus on systemic risk. 100 Many of the
country's economic crises, after all, have been precipitated by crises in
the financial sector.1 01 When banks struggle, their problems ripple out
to the broader economy. This type of externality is a classic rationale
for government regulation, and, as a result, financial regulation has
been structured so as to minimize systemic risk.1 02
96. See JOHN ARMOUR, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY GORDON, COLIN
MAYER & JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 22-51 (2016) (discussing the
underlying policies and principles of financial regulation).
97. Id. at 26 (analyzing the relationship between financial markets and overall economic
health).
98. See Alan S. Binder, It's Broke, Let's Fix It: Rethinking Financial Regulation, 6 INT'L J.
CENT. BANKING 277, 279-80 (2010) (discussing the four main reasons for financial regulations).
99. Id. at 51-80 (providing in-depth explanations of these rationales).
100. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2013) (analyzing the implications of ex
ante and ex post approaches to reducing financial systemic risk); Robert Charles Clark, The
Soundness ofFinancial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976) (describing the rationales underlying
the regulation of risk at financial companies); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial
Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that the principal issues that financial regulation is
intended to address are market stability and risk-taking).
101. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 1-20 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing how wealth mismanagement and
misuse of credit often led to financial crises).
102. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 96, at 51-52 (noting the reactionary structuring of
financial regulation).
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The term "systemic risk" is a widely used but poorly understood
concept. Systemic risk generally refers to the probability that economic
shocks in one part of a financial system can lead to shocks in other parts
of that system. 103 Thus, an institution presents a high degree of
systemic risk when adverse shocks to the institution are likely to be
transmitted to other institutions in a domino-like fashion. For example,
large banks are considered to present systemic risks because, if they
fail, their failure has a high probability of causing adverse effects on
other banks and financial institutions. Those institutions will then
experience their own economic shocks, and so on and so forth, ending
with a diminution of activity in the broader economy and potentially a
reduction in growth or even recession in the macroeconomy. 1 04
There has been a significant amount of economic literature on
the stability of various market structures and their relative levels of
systemic risk. 105 While there is by no means consensus in the field, four
factors stand out as primary contributors: (1) the extent to which
individual actors are vulnerable to rapid, adverse shocks; 106 (2) the
existence of multiple pathways for adverse shocks to spread from a
single institution to others; 10 (3) the level of asymmetric information in
103. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 444-45 (2011) (noting that
"[tihe existing literature has generally identified systemic risk as the risk of a single firm's failure
having substantial negative effects on the broader economy"); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk,
97 GEO. L.J. 193, 197 (2008) (describing systemic risk as involving "a trigger event, such as an
economic shock or institutional failure, [that] causes a chain of bad economic consequences-
sometimes referred to as a domino effect").
104. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1-2 (2000)
("One theory is that small shocks, which initially affect only a few institutions or a particular
region of the economy, spread by contagion to the rest of the financial sector and then infect the
larger economy.").
105. See, e.g., George G. Kaufman, Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence, 8 J.
FIN. SERVS. RES. 123 (1994) (discussing the abundance of literature on failure contagion); Marina
Brogi, Valentina Lagasio & Luca Riccetti, Systemic Risk Measurement: Bucketing G-SIBs
Between Literature and Supervisory View (Feb. 10, 2017) (unpublished working paper),
https://ssrn.comlabstract=2915172 [https://perma.cc/WY36-22EB]) (noting previous works on
financial systems and systemic risks).
106. See JOSEPH FIKSEL, RESILIENT BY DESIGN: CREATING BUSINESSES THAT ADAPT AND
FLOURISH IN A CHANGING WORLD 4-6 (2015) (discussing the susceptibility of business enterprises
to disruption); NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 20-21
(2012) (noting the effects of shock on institutions); Lawrence H. White, Antifragile Banking and
Monetary Systems, 33 CATO J. 471, 474-79 (2013) (discussing how legal restrictions may have
contributed to the fragility of banking systems).
107. See Fabio Caccioli, Munik Shrestha, Christopher Moore & J. Doyne Farmer, Stability
Analysis of Financial Contagion Due to Overlapping Portfolios, 46 J. BANKING & FIN. 233, 233
(2014) ("Financial contagion comes through different channels, including (i) counterparty risk, (ii)
roll-over risk, and (iii) common asset holdings, i.e. overlapping portfolios."); Graciela Kaminsky,
Carmen Reinhardt & Carlos V6gh, The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
51 (2003) (discussing the spread of financial contagion); Olivier de Bandt & Philipp Hartmann,
Systemic Risk: A Survey 10-18 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 35, 2000),
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the market;108 and (4) the overall size of the market. 109 While the
presence of any one of these features in a market may not be sufficient
to conclude that a market poses a systemic risk to the economy, the
presence of all four should be considered a red flag.
With respect to the first factor, systemic risk generally increases
where individual actors in a system are vulnerable to rapid, adverse
shocks. In other words, where particular firms are highly dependent on
volatile resources or products or customers, the likelihood that any
single adverse change will cause significant harm to the firm increases.
Indeed, in recent years, a number of scholars have focused on ways to
make firms and markets "antifragile."110 The idea here is that certain
traits make individuals and institutions resilient, or even help them to
thrive, in the face of stress. In particular, an institution is antifragile
when it is flexible and responsive to change, rather than rigid and
unbending. One classic way to increase the resiliency of an institution
is through diversification. 11' If firms are widely invested in a number of
uncorrelated areas, the likelihood that a change in circumstances will
affect all of their interests decreases. An alternative way to increase
resiliency, and thus reduce vulnerability, is to establish asset buffers to
withstand stresses.1 12 This has been one of the primary approaches
https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=258430 [https://perma.ce/MM3Z-VVSX]
(noting the propagation mechanisms for systemic shock).
108. See Bandt & Hartmann, supra note 107, at 6 ("Some financial crises might just eliminate
inefficient players in the system, in particular when asymmetric information has prevented the
market mechanism from doing its job ex ante."); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke,
Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk, in 2B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE
1221, 1233-38 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & Ren6 M. Stulz eds., 2013) (discussing
the lack of common knowledge inherent to asymmetrical information).
109. See Timothy Geithner, Are We Safe Yet? How to Manage Financial Crises, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan./Feb. 2017, at 54 (discussing the impacts of a large market system on the ability of
governments to limit the effects of shock).
110. The term was coined by Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his 2012 book, Antifragile, to refer to
systems that can resist catastrophic failure. TALEB, supra note 106. It has since been used to
examine regulatory frameworks in a number of areas, from mortgages to intellectual property to
the law school market. See Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Anti-Herding Regulation, 5 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 17 (2015) ("The importance of the distribution of variation is stated in terms of probability
theory by risk-management scholar Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his writings on uncertainty and
fragility."); Jennifer Qerardo Brown, Sustaining the Canary in Toxic Times: Parables About
Survival for Legal Education, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 536 (2016) (using the term "antifragile"
in reference to law school markets); Michal Shur-Ofry & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Constructive Ambiguity:
IP Licenses As a Case Study, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 391, 405 n.54 (2015) (citing Taleb's book,
Antifragile).
111. See White, supra note 106, at 476 ("We will not have achieved robustness, much less
antifragility, until no single financial firm is considered systemically critical or too important to
close.").
112. See Stijn Claessens, Capital and Liquidity Requirements: A Review of the Issues and
Literature, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 735, 742 (2014) ("It is clear that both asset and liability structures
are crucial for a bank's sound and efficient operations at reasonable ('prudent') levels of risk.").
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used by domestic and international regulators to increase the stability
of financial institutions-specifically, regulators require banks and
other firms to establish minimum capital-to-asset ratios to ensure that
they will have sufficient reserves to draw on in times of difficulty. 113
The second factor that increases the likelihood of systemic risk
is the existence of multiple pathways for the propagation of economic
shocks. One particularly powerful form of propagation mechanism is
interconnectedness. 114 If firms in a market are highly dependent on
each other by, for example, relying on other participants for essential
parts of their business or having contracts and agreements that require
the cooperation (and solvency) of the other firms, then it will be more
likely for shocks in one institution to spread to other institutions. A
recent example of this phenomenon was the widespread use of credit
default swaps before the financial crisis. Credit default swaps are
complex financial derivatives that are effectively contracts requiring
one party to pay another party in the event of the default or bankruptcy
of a third party. 115 While they were initially designed as a way to protect
a party from the risk that another party would not comply with the
terms of its agreements, they eventually morphed into a giant market
(which at its height was worth $58 trillion) for bets on the financial
insolvency of certain institutions.11 6 But when Lehman Brothers, a
large investment bank, failed in 2007, and other firms failed or
threatened to fail in the coming months, the failure had far-reaching
repercussions throughout the industry, as the credit default swaps
effectively magnified and transmitted these losses to other actors. 117
Propagation mechanisms take a number of less obvious forms as well,
such as closely coordinated business strategies, shared risks, and
113. See Robert F. Weber, Post-Crisis Reform of the Supervisory System and High Reliability
Theory, 50 GA. L. REV. 249, 255 (2015) (noting that minimum capital ratios are the "most loss-
absorbent capital").
114. See Zachary Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral Hazard and the Problem
of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REV. 221, 252-53 (2012) ('The systematic moral
hazard problem is likely to lead to increased failure risk at both the securitized bank and at other
entities that are 'too interconnected to fail.' ").
115. For a fuller description of the nature and growth of the credit default market, see Douglas
B. Levene, Credit Default Swaps and Insider Trading, 7 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 231 (2012).
116. See Sean Campbell & Josh Gallin, Risk Transfer Across Economic Sectors Using Credit
Default Swaps, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2014/risk-transfer-across-economic-sectors-using-credit-default-
swaps-20140903.html [https://perma.ccl5SEB-27JU].
117. See Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why
Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49,




consumer behavioral patterns, all of which can serve to spread economic
shocks from one actor to another. 118
The third factor that increases systemic risk in an industry is
the presence of significant information asymmetries in the market. 119 If
parties cannot accurately assess the status or solvency of other actors
in a market in times of economic shock, they may well assume the worst
and take retrenching actions, such as terminating contracts,
withdrawing deposits, or pursuing litigation. 12 0 This can lead to
cascading effects, as the lack of information requires parties to act as if
the information is bad. 121 Information asymmetries were at the root of
the bank runs of the Great Depression: unsure about the reserves and
future actions of rural banks where they had deposited their savings,
depositories assumed that banks were likely to fail and thus hurried to
withdraw their assets. 12 2 Information asymmetries also contribute to
systemic risk by reducing market efficiency. 123 When information is
unavailable or prohibitively expensive to gather, beneficial transactions
are disincentivized, resulting in inefficient markets that are more
susceptible to collapse. 124
Finally, systemic risk increases as the overall size of a market
increases. The concept here is simple: the more central a market is to
the broader economy, the more likely it is that cascading failures or
adverse changes in the market will have a substantial effect on
118. See Stijn Claessens, Rudiger Dornbusch & Yung Chul Park, Contagion: Why Crises
Spread and How This Can Be Stopped, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONTAGION 36 (Stijn
Claessens & Kristin J. Forbes eds., 2001) (discussing less prominent propagation mechanisms);
Kristin Forbes & Roberto Rigobon, Measuring Contagion: Conceptual and Empirical Issues, in
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONTAGION, supra, at 43-66 (defining "contagion" and detailing its
spread).
119. Some scholars have even argued that information asymmetry is the primary cause of
systemic risk. See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central
Banking, 53 J. MONETARY ECON. 1613, 1618 (2006) (stating that information asymmetry
significantly contributes to widespread panic and fund withdrawals).
120. See Utset, supra note 7, at 803-09 (noting that parties may not always have all available
information, and this lack of information plays into business decisions).
121. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity,
and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 696-97 (2012) ( ating that information loss leads to
uncertainty and fear of the future).
122. See Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts,
and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed.,
1991) (defining bank runs and discussing their resulting inefficiencies).
123. Id.
124. Id. Information asymmetries increase uncertainty for the party at an informational
disadvantage. This uncertainty can generate inefficiencies in one of two ways: first, it may lead
parties to enter into value-destroying transactions that they would have avoided if they had
sufficient information; and, second, it may lead parties to refrain from entering into value-creating
transactions that they would have agreed on if they had sufficient information. Id.
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economic growth. 125 One of the reasons why the subprime mortgage
crisis triggered the financial crisis was the sheer size of the industry:
U.S. home mortgage debt relative to GDP rose from 46% in the 1990s
to 73% in 2008, reaching a total of $10.5 trillion.126 If the market had
been smaller, its collapse might not have had the far-reaching
implications that it did. 127
Financial regulation has attempted to reduce systemic risk in
the financial industry by targeting these potential vulnerabilities
(although, for obvious reasons, they have generally refrained from
limiting the overall size of the financial industry). Capital adequacy
requirements reduce the vulnerability of individual institutions to
external shocks, deposit guarantees reduce the propensity for failures
at one institution to spread to other institutions, and disclosure
requirements reduce information asymmetries. 128 While the relative
importance of these various factors in the financial regulatory scheme
has varied over time, the basic focus on systemic risk has remained a
constant.
B. Dodd-Frank and Too Big to Fail
Following the financial crisis, the focus on systemic risk reached
a fever pitch. 129 The underlying causes of the crisis are still the matter
of substantial debate, but most observers agree that the financial
industry played an essential role in creating unacceptably high levels
of systemic risk. 1 3 0 In an interesting twist, however, systemic risk
125. See Geithner, supra note 109, at 56 (describing how "[w]hen expected losses to the value
of assets appear very large, there will be uncertainty about which party will bear those losses,"
leading to a "general reduction in funding for a broad range of financial institutions"). Conversely,
small markets are less likely to pose systemic risks. See Roger Ferguson & David Laster, Hedge
Funds and Systemic Risk, in BANQUE DE FRANCE, No. 10, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW 45, 51
(2007) (noting that losses in small, isolated markets have 'little systemic risk").
126. Colin Barr, The $4 Trillion Housing Headache, FORTUNE (May 27, 2009, 4:05 PM),
http://archive.fortune.com/2009/05/27/news/mortgage.overhang.fortune/index.htm
[https://perma.cclJ6PQ-25HB].
127. On the other hand, the rise of mortgage-backed securities amplified the effects of the
mortgage crisis. By allowing individual parties to buy and sell contracts based on the price of
mortgages, mortgage-backed securities created a situation in which much more than the value of
the mortgage was at stake in any individual home loan.
128. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 96, at 51-80 (discussing methods for reducing risks).
129. See Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 193 (describing the increasing attention to systemic
risks and offering a conceptual framework for identifying them); Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of
Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 673 (2010)
("Going forward, the central problem for financial regulation (defined as the prescription of rules,
as distinct from supervision or risk assessment) is to reduce systemic risk.").
130. For a sampling of the divergent views, see ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED:
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD (2013); Ross GARNAUT & DAVID
LLEWELLYN-SMITH, THE GREAT CRASH OF 2008 (2009); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S.
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became widely connected with a similar, though slightly different,
concept-"too big to fail." 131
Generally speaking, the "too big to fail" concept refers to the idea
that once institutions (primarily banks) reach a certain size and become
sufficiently integrated into financial networks such that their failure
would impose significant costs on other sectors of the economy, the
government cannot plausibly allow them to fail and, instead, in cases of
crisis, will always intervene to bail them out. 13 2 Understanding this
dynamic, large banks have incentives to engage in excessively risky
behavior (such as large bets on complex derivatives or investments in
subprime mortgages) because they will not bear the full costs of their
actions. This is the classic problem of moral hazard. 133 Knowing that
gains will be internalized while losses are externalized, large banks
(and bankers working at those banks) do not feel the normal constraints
of market discipline and instead can act with a reckless disregard for
catastrophic loss. 1 3 4 "Too big to fail" institutions, thus, can become the
engines of systemic risk in the economy.
In the years after the financial crisis, "too big to fail" became a
focus of both public outrage and legislative action. The belief that the
root causes of the financial crisis lay in the increasing concentration of
ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); NOURIEL
ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE
(2010); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD
EcONOMY (2010).
131. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES (2010) (detailing
the financial crisis on Wall Street and the concept of "too big to fail"); John Crawford, Predicting
Failure, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 171, 173 (2012) (describing the problems of "hidden risk and
bureaucratic inertia in the regulation of systemically important financial institutions").
132. There is some debate about whether the root problem of "too big to fail" is the size of the
institution or the interconnectedness of the institution. See Gubler, supra note 114, at 253 (arguing
that financial markets have created institutions that must be rescued from failure, not because
they are too large, but because they are "too interconnected with other institutions in the capital
markets"); see also Marcelo Dab6s, Too Big to Fail in the Banking Industry: A Survey, in TOO BIG
TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICE IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 141, 141 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004)
("The too big to fail (TBTF) doctrine states that governments will intervene in order to prevent
failures of large institutions, mainly banks.").
133. See John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 95 (2015) ("Moral hazard plays a central role in almost every narrative of the
recent financial crisis .... ). For descriptions of the application of moral hazard in other
industries, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers'Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247,
255-57 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in
Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330 (2005); Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral
Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673 (2013); and Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93
Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979).
134. See generally Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The End of
Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees (May 1, 2016)




power-and therefore systemic risk-into a few super-large Wall Street
banks drove financial reform efforts in the postcrisis years, the most
important result of which was the enactment in 2010 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.135 Dodd-Frank was
the most far-reaching reform of financial regulation enacted since the
Great Depression. And while the Act addressed nearly every
conceivable aspect of modern finance-from the creation of new
regulators, to greater consumer protections, to new laws on the
behavior of credit rating agencies-many of the reforms, and many of
the related resources, were devoted to resolving the "too big to fail"
problem.
The Dodd-Frank Act takes three general approaches to resolving
the "too big to fail" problem. The first set of approaches aims to prevent
such institutions from being created in the first place by prohibiting
certain concentrations of -assets and liabilities within any one
corporation. The second set of approaches aims to regulate the behavior
of "too big to fail" institutions when they do arise to reduce the risks
and costs associated with them by, for example, monitoring their
behavior more closely and constraining their risky behavior. The third
set of approaches aims to prevent the perverse incentives created by the
perception of an institution being considered "too big to fail" by ex ante
binding the hands of government to prevent it from bailing out failing
financial firms.
First, the Act contains a number of provisions intended to
prevent systemically important, "too big to fail" institutions from being
created in the first place. For example, the Act imposes flat-out
prohibitions on certain concentrations of liabilities within financial
institutions. 136 These include prohibitions of any mergers or
consolidations that would lead to a firm having more than 10% of the
total liabilities of certain groups of financial firms or, in the case of a
bank, having more than 10% of the total amount of deposits of insured
depository institutions.137 The Act also grants the Federal Reserve the
135. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 52 (2011),
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn medialfcic-reports/fcic final report full.pdf
[https://perma.cclWZY6-ECJR]. For an alternative view of the root causes of the financial crisis,
and the proper legislative response, see MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING
FINANCIAL REGULATION, at x (2016) (arguing that "the fragility of the short-term funding markets
was a central problem-perhaps the central problem-for financial stability policy").
136. 12 U.S.C. § 1852(b) (2012) (providing that "a financial company may not merge or
consolidate with ... another company, if the total consolidated liabilities of the acquiring financial
company upon consummation of the transaction would exceed 10 percent of the aggregate
consolidated liabilities of all financial companies").
137. See Proposed Dodd-Frank Concentration Limit on Financial Institution M&A
Transactions, DAVIS POLK 3 (May 27, 2014), https://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/
2018]1 1195
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
authority to require financial companies to terminate activities or sell
assets if the firm has more than $50 billion in assets and poses a "grave
threat to the financial stability of the United States." 138 The aim of
these types of regulations is to prevent companies from acquiring,
through mergers or acquisitions, sufficient size or interconnectedness
to render them "too big to fail."
Second, with respect to reducing the risks associated with "too
big to fail" institutions when they arise, a number of provisions of Dodd-
Frank establish higher standards of conduct for large financial
institutions. Perhaps the most important of these is Title I of the Act,
which created a new governmental body, the Financial Stability
Oversight Council ("FSOC"), to oversee financial institutions and
identify emerging threats to financial stability. 139 The FSOC has
authority to reinforce a comprehensive regulatory regime, also
established by Title I of the Act, aimed specifically at large bank holding
companies and other "systemically important" nonbank firms. 140 The
FSOC is required to identify financial institutions that could pose a
threat to the financial stability of the United States if they failed or
otherwise engaged in risky activities. Once an institution is designated
as a systemically important financial institution (or "SIFI"), a
heightened regulatory regime is triggered, imposing a range of
behavioral and disclosure-based obligations on the firm. 14 1 Systemically
important financial institutions must hold additional capital in order to
ensure that they can withstand losses. 142 They must undergo regular
"stress tests," designed to determine what the effect of certain economic
shocks (such as a recession) would have on the firms. 143 They must also
05.27.14.Dodd-Frank.Concentration.Limit_ on_.Financial.Institution.MA_.pdf [https://perma.cc/
73UM-JVD2] (providing an overview of the Federal Reserve's concentration limit proposal).
138. 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a).
139. See Hilary J. Allen, Putting the "Financial Stability" in Financial Stability Oversight
Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1113-20 (2015) (describing the structure and mandate of FSOC).
140. See Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd-Frank Act End Too Big
to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 40-46 (2012) (describing the role of FSOC and the Office of
Financial Research).
141. The process of labeling a company as "systemically important" has been a fraught one.
When FSOC designated the insurer MetLife as "systemically important" in 2014, MetLife
challenged the designation in court, and the district court subsequently struck down the
designation. The decision is now on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See
Ryan Tracy, MetLife Asks Appeals Court to Uphold Removal of 'SIFT' Label, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16,
2016, 10:38 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/metlife-asks-appeals-court-to-uphold-removal-of-
sifi-label-1471355267 [https://perma.cc/CTW2-97QH].
142. See Krishnamurthy, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that the enhanced capital requirements
for SIFIs under the Dodd-Frank Act are consistent with broader international developments under
the Basel Accords).
143. For an in-depth discussion of how stress tests work in practice, see Robert Weber, A




create "living wills," or plans for how to be liquidated in an orderly
manner and without a taxpayer bailout in the event that they do fail. 144
The overriding concern animating this set of regulations is to increase
the stringency of regulatory requirements for large financial
institutions.
Third, in order to prevent the moral hazard associated with
financial institutions that are "too big to fail," the Act contains a
commitment mechanism: it prohibits the federal government from
intervening to bail out financial firms at all. During the financial crisis,
the Treasury intervened in the market to purchase the troubled assets
of failing firms such as Citigroup and Bank of America. 145 By doing so,
the government in effect prevented banks and their creditors from
taking losses that they would otherwise have suffered. 146 Of course, if
parties believe that they will be bailed out if losses are too high, then
they will be incentivized to engage in excessively risky behavior. Dodd-
Frank aims to prevent this dynamic by prohibiting the Federal Reserve
from making emergency loans to specific firms.1 4 7 It also terminates the
Federal Deposit Insurance Company's ("FDIC") emergency loan
guarantee authority.1 48 Finally, Dodd-Frank restricts the ability of the
Treasury Department to create anything resembling the Troubled
Asset Relief Program that in effect prevented banks and creditors from
bearing the full costs of their behavior. 149 Instead, the Act provides for
an FDIC-run receivership for the orderly liquidation of failing financial
firms.o5 0 In other words, the government has bound its hands in order
to credibly commit to nonintervention in the event of widespread
financial losses.
C. Systemic Risk and Too Big to Fail
The close relationship between systemic risk and the "too big to
fail" phenomenon has been echoed in academic commentary on
144. See Nisan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against the Dodd-Frank Act's Living Wills:
Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 39 (2012)
(describing living wills under the Dodd-Frank Act).
145. See Jonathan G. Katz, Who Benefited From the Bailout?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1568, 1581-82
(2011) (describing how Citibank and Bank of America benefited from the Troubled Asset Relief
Program ("TARP")).
146. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 7, at 190-93 (describing the FDIC's role).
147. Id. at 152-53.
148. For a discussion of the problematic incentives of emergency loan authority, see Anthony
J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 534
(2015).
149. For a discussion of the "constitutional monstrosity" that was TARP, see Gary Lawson,
Burying the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55, 58 (2010).
150. See id. at 190-93 (describing the FDIC's receivership process under Dodd-Frank).
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financial regulation. Much recent scholarship on how to reform the
financial industry has focused on reducing the risks posed by large
institutions to the broader economy. 151 This literature has had the effect
of cementing the identification of systemic risk as primarily a problem
of institutional size.
This line of scholarship argues that large financial institutions
are the primary threat to financial stability for a number of interrelated
reasons. First, because of their size, large financial institutions
necessarily create larger costs when they fail or experience adverse
conditions: the failure of a bank with $1 billion in deposits will impose
greater costs than the failure of a bank with $1 million, all else equal.1 5 2
Second, because large financial institutions have connections to more
parties, when they fail or suffer severe losses, these events reverberate
and affect a greater number of parties.1 53 So, both from a size and an
interconnectedness standpoint, large financial institutions have the
potential to impose greater costs on the wider economy than small
financial institutions. Third, and finally, large financial institutions are
more likely to engage in regulatory capture, ensuring that regulators
will turn a blind eye to-or worse, fully legalize-risky behavior by
banks. 154 Through lobbying or the revolving door phenomenon, large
banks have an outsized influence in government and thus have a
greater ability to affect the content of regulations as they develop and
are enforced. Indeed, regulatory capture by big banks has become a
stock explanation for the financial crisis. 55
For all these reasons, existing literature has closely identified
systemic risk with the "too big to fail" phenomenon. According to this
conventional wisdom, large financial institutions are both more likely
to engage in risky behavior and more likely to create negative
externalities when they do so. Thus, it should come as no surprise that
systemically important financial institutions have become the focus of
legislative and regulatory attention in recent years.
151. See sources cited supra note 7.
152. See Krishnamurthy, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that "the presence of large,
interconnected, systemically important banks ensures that the externalities from their failure will
be large").
153. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 7, at 154 ("The failure of a large financial firm may
threaten others both because financial firms are interlinked and because firms following similar
business strategies are likely to sink together.").
154. See Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARv. L. REV. 1991, 1995-2037 (2014) (describing regulatory capture




III. FINTECH'S REGULATORY CHALLENGES
The assumption underlying financial regulation in the posterisis
era has been that large, "too big to fail" financial institutions are the
primary source of systemic risk in the financial industry. This
assumption animates many of the key provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act. It has also driven much of the academic scholarship on financial
regulation in recent years. But this Part will argue that the focus on
large financial institutions as the primary engines of systemic risk has
obscured the extent to which small, decentralized actors can present
systemic risk problems as well. These lesser financial actors can create
negative externalities for the wider economy in much the same way that
large ones can. In fact, in many ways, small actors may have greater
incentives, and abilities, to engage in excessively risky behavior than
large, more established ones. Given the dramatic shift toward fintech
companies, which have revolutionized finance by decentralizing and
automating financial services, it is essential that regulators and
scholars start to look more seriously at the costs and benefits of the shift
from concentrated markets to dispersed ones. 156
In particular, this Part will argue that fintech poses three
unique challenges for financial regulation. First, fintech has led to the
proliferation of small, disaggregated actors that may be more
susceptible to external shocks than traditional financial institutions.
Second, the operations of fintech firms are significantly more opaque
than those of traditional, large financial institutions, rendering it
difficult if not impossible for regulators to effectively monitor their
behavior. Third, fintech firms, because of their small size and dispersed
nature, are less restricted by reputational constraints 'than large
financial institutions. All of these challenges suggest that fintech poses
unique and potentially more worrisome concerns than the "too big to
fail" firms that have been the focus of regulatory attention in recent
years.
A. The Systemic Risk of Decentralization
The rise of fintech raises a number of concerns about fintech's
effect on the stability of the financial system as a whole. These concerns
156. This is not to say that particular fintech services are completely unregulated.
Crowdfunding platforms may be regulated under the securities laws. Virtual currency platforms
may fall under banking regulations. Investment advice may be regulated under the Investment
Advisors Act. To the extent that fintech firms are offering services that fall under existing
regulatory schemes, they will face regulatory scrutiny much as traditional financial firms do. But
current regulations, by focusing on particular substantive areas rather than overall structures,
overlook the broader implications of fintech for systemic stability.
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are closely connected with the structure of the fintech industry and the
ways that fintech firms operate, as well as the particular innovations
that fintech is introducing to the market. In important ways, fintech's
systemic risk concerns are the mirror image of those presented by
traditional Wall Street banks: while large institutions have a number
of pathologies and misincentives, so too do small, disaggregated ones.
To return to the systemic risk factors identified above, systemic
risk is highest when individual actors are fragile, shocks are easily
propagated, information asymmetries are widespread, and the overall
market is large. 15 7 A close analysis of the factors suggests that
concentrated markets are not necessarily more susceptible to systemic
risk than dispersed or disaggregated ones. While the failure of a large
institution may well have a greater magnitude of effect than the failure
of a small one, large firms may also be less likely to fail given their
economics of scale, diversification, and capitalization. 158 The ultimate
level of systemic risk in an industry will depend on the interaction of
these factors, and the single-minded focus on institutional size can
obscure the extent to which other factors can elevate risk.
How, then, does fintech fit into this picture? The assumption
underlying much of financial regulation in the postcrisis era has been
that "too big to fail" institutions present the greatest systemic risk to
the broader economy. But the absolute size-measured as assets or
revenues or some similar metric-of individual institutions in a market
is not fully correlated with the systemic risk of the market as a whole.
Instead, the small size and dispersed nature of the fintech industry
raises its own systemic risk concerns.
First, as mentioned above, systemic risk increases in situations
where actors are vulnerable to rapid, adverse shocks. Fintech firms are
more susceptible to these types of shocks than traditional players in a
number of ways. The typical fintech firm is small, leanly staffed, and
narrowly focused on one type of service. For instance, the prominent
robo-advisor Betterment has fewer than 200 employees and focuses
solely on investment advice, eschewing other means for generating
revenue; 159 the small business lending company Prosper has just 150
157. See supra Section II.A.
158. See Small Is Not Beautiful, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/
21548945 [https://perma.cc/2YH7-B2DZ].
159. Telis Demos, Betterment Valued at Nearly $500 Million in New Round, WALL ST. J.:
MONEYBEAT (Feb. 19, 2015, 2:38 PM), https:/fblogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/02/19/betterment-
valued-at-nearly-500-million-in-new-round/ [https://perma.cc/9Q85-4NRH]. This situation may
change, though, as one prominent robo-advisor, Wealthfront, recently announced that it will enter
the loan market. See Julie Verhage, Robo-Adviser Wants to Lend You Money, Not Just Manage It,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 19, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-19/this-
1200 [Vol. 71:4:1167
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employees in its San Francisco headquarters and, despite being a leader
in the industry, has yet to turn a profit;160 and virtual currency
companies are even smaller, with an average of only twelve employees
per company in North America. 16 1 This feature of fintech-its low
overhead and efficient business model-has been responsible for much
of fintech's success, but it also renders it vulnerable to swift changes in
fortune. When it was discovered that a hacker had made off with $50
million in Ethereum currency that was owned by a joint venture fund
called the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (or "DAO"), the
fund swiftly shut down and the value of Ethereum prices dropped 38%
in an hour.162 A few months later, in a separate crash, the value of
Ethereum dropped from $335 to $0.10 in a matter of minutes. 163
Without the diversification and size of large banks, fintech firms have
a high degree of variability in results and thus are susceptible to rapid
and dramatic changes in fortune. 164
Second, the fintech industry contains a variety of features that,
in times of economic stress, can serve as propagation mechanisms for
shocks. Perhaps the most obvious mechanism, and one that has long
been a concern in the fintech world, is shared susceptibility to
hacking. 165 While hacking can come in many forms-from merely
gathering information to theft to outright system failure-the
robo-adviser-wants-to-lend-you-money-not-just-manage-it (last updated Apr. 19, 2017, 2:11 PM)
[https://perma.cc/4UP2-AHXR].
160. See Oscar Williams-Grut, Funding Circle CEO Says It's a "Golden Age" for Marketplace
Lending as Revenue Jumps 144%, Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/
funding-circle-ceo-samir-desai-on-lending-club-2015-accounts-and-us-business-2016-9
[https://perma.cc42L4-28QQ].
161. GARRICK HILEMAN & MICHEL RAuCHS, CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN., GLOBAL
CRYPTOCURRENCY BENCHMARKING STUDY 25 (2017), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/
user upload/research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/2017-global-cryptocurrency-
benchmarking-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3W6-7HWB].
162. See Kint Finley, A $50 Million Hack Just Showed That the DAO Was All Too Human,
WIRED (June 18, 2016, 4:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-
dao-human/ [https://perma.cclJE53-LKHF]; Paul Vigna, Fund Based on Digital Currency
Ethereum to Wind Down After Alleged Hack, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/
investment-fund-based-on-digital-currency-to-wind-down-after-alleged-hack-1466175033 (last
updated June 17, 2016, 7:27 PM) [https://perma.cc/22EZ-EEHG].
163. See Paul Vigna, Volatile Digital Currency Suffers 'Flash Crash,' WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/volatile-digital-currency-suffers-flash-crash-1498260100 (last
updated June 23, 2017, 8:12 PM) [https://perma.cc/EQ29-HHFQ].
164. And, at least in the currency realm, they do not benefit from the backing of a central bank
that can reassure jittery markets. See Hilary J. Allen, $ = C = Bitcoin? (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch.,
Working Paper No. 15-33, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2645001 [https://perma.cc/9SNF-
6EUE].
165. Hacking, of course, is also a major concern for traditional financial institutions, forcing
them to spend significant amounts of money on cybersecurity efforts. But the magnitude of
fintech's exposure to hacking is far greater than that of traditional players, given that many fintech
firms' entire models are based on coding and other forms of automated decisionmaking.
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possibility that the programming that underlies an industry might
contain vulnerabilities is a clear pathway for adverse shocks to
spread. 166 Another related propagation mechanism is automated
decisionmaking that may lead to excessively correlated actions. Take,
for example, the asset management industry. One potential systemic
concern in the asset management sector is that if firms face large-scale
redemptions from their funds in a time of stress, they may need to
unwind their positions in the market on unfavorable terms.167 If the
terms become more unfavorable as the crisis deepens, then first-movers
will have an advantage in the market. This can create the kind of
systemic risk that underlay the last financial crisis, with firms
engaging in "fire sales" of troubled assets in order to reduce the risk of
facing even greater losses if they waited to see how markets
recovered. 168 Now, of course, if the decisions of asset managers are
merely reflecting the primary decisions by investors, then perhaps the
asset management firms should not properly be considered as creators
of the risk. Instead, they are merely executing the decisions of others.
But in fintech, much investment advice, and in some cases investment
decisions themselves, are made by computer algorithms. 169 These
algorithms have not yet been tested in times of market turmoil. And at
least in other areas of trading, it is widely believed that algorithmic
high-speed trading has contributed to instability in markets. 170 Perhaps
more importantly, if fintech asset management algorithms as a class
exhibit "herd behavior"-that is, they tend to make similar decisions
based on the decisions of others-then systemic risk is amplified.171
166. See Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products,
Intermediation and Markets, 21 J. TECH. L. & POLY 55, 106-07 (2016) (outlining challenges faced
by private money-based economies).
167. See Douglas J. Elliott, Systemic Risk and the Asset Management Industry, BROOKINGS
INST. 4 (May 2014), https://www.brookings.edulwp-content/uploads/2016/06/systemicriskasset
management-elliott.pdf [https:/perma.cclV57V-PS57].
168. See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, ASSET MANAGEMENT AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY 9-20 (2013), http://financialresearch.gov/reports/files/ofrasset
.management andfinancial-stability.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7U5-HNSA].
169. See Robin Wigglesworth, Fintech: Search for a Super-Algo, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/5eb91614-bee5-11e5-846f-79bOe3d2Oeaf [https://perma.cc/FY2K-
QHL6].
170. See Pankaj K. Jain, Pawan Jain & Thomas H. McInish, Does High-Frequency Trading
Increase Systemic Risk?, 31 J. FIN. MKTS. 1, 1 (2016) (studying the Tokyo Stock Exchange and
finding that high-frequency trading could lead to risks like flash crashes).
171. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 356 (1996) (further
describing herd behavior); David Scharfstein & Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (1990) (describing the forces that lead to "herd behavior"). In the
crowdfunding arena, recent developments with respect to the securitization of peer-to-peer
unsecured loans also raise systemic risk concerns. See Werner Bijkerk, Risks and Benefits of
Crowd-Funding, INT'L ORG. SEC. COMMISSIONS 28 (Apr. 10, 2014),
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Third, information asymmetries in the fintech industry are
high.172 Most fintech firms are not subject to the extensive disclosure
obligations that large, public financial institutions are, and thus there
is significantly less information about them available. 1 7 3 This lack of
information can become an important, and dangerous, channel for
propagating systemic risk in times of adversity. Bursts of financial
creativity create markets ripe for speculation and, potentially,
bubbles. '4 Consider the crowdfunding industry's practice of offloading
risk. Many peer-to-peer lending platforms provide ways for individuals
and companies to transact with one another, with the platforms
themselves not bearing any of the risks associated with the resulting
transactions.1 7 5 This offloading of risk to third parties raises the
possibility that crowdfunding firms will encourage excessively risky
behavior. After all, if a fintech mortgage company benefits from each
mortgage that it generates but bears none of the cost of loans that go
bad, it has few short-term incentives to discourage risky mortgages
from being created and sold. 176 In these scenarios, fintech firms benefit
from creating and perpetuating positions of asymmetric information.
Finally, the overall size of the fintech industry, while smaller
than the portion of the market controlled by traditional institutional
players, is growing quickly. A recent survey of the fintech industry
found that fintech companies had raised $105 billion in total funding
and that the overall size of the industry by value is now $870 billion.' 7 7
https://www.iosco.org/research/pdf/20140410-Risks-and-Benefits-of-Crowdfunding.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J77C-HD341.
172. See Brown, supra note 140, at 37-46 (discussing three-dimensional information
asymmetry); Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-
Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 755 (1997) (discussing the impact of technology on
information).
173. See Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Opening Remarks at the Fintech Forum
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-opening-remarks-fintech-forum.html
[https://perma.ccl8X7W-ZGJF].
174. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 101, at 48-52.
175. See From the People, for the People, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21650289-will-financial-democracy-work-
downturn-people-people [https://perma.ccIS9CL-6AZJI (describing peer-to-peer lending
companies, such as Lending Club).
176. Of course, it may have long-term incentives to maintain a reputation for providing high-
quality, reliable loans and investment opportunities. But where the long-term interests of the
company and the short-term interests of the managers of the company diverge, it is far from clear
that the long-term interests will win out. See Magnuson, supra note 9 (discussing the balance of
long-term and short-term interests).
177. Jean Baptiste Su, The Global Fintech Landscape Reaches over 1000 Companies, $105B in
Funding, $867B in Value: Report, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2016, 4:13 PM), https://www.forbes.comlsites/
jeanbaptiste/2016/09/28/the-global-fintech-landscape-reaches-over- 1000-companies- 105b-in-
funding-867b-in-value-report/#3d103e4b26f3 [https://perma.cclE4L4-HE7FJ. In comparison, the
largest U.S. bank, JPMorgan Chase, had a market capitalization of $240 billion in 2016. Ben Eisen,
J.P. Morgan Leapfrogs over Wells Fargo in Market Capitalization, WALL ST. J.,
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Investment in fintech doubled between 2014 and 2015.178 Large banks
are expecting that this trend will continue and are already foreseeing
significant impacts on their own profitability. 179 Additionally, fintech is
not just a Silicon Valley phenomenon: London, China, and Singapore
all are home to significant fintech activity. 180 As a proportion of total
market size, fintech firms are also quickly expanding.181 As the size of
the fintech industry grows, so too will the systemic risks associated with
it.
B. Regulatory Opacity
As the previous Section demonstrated, fintech raises a number
of red flags related to systemic risk: fintech firms are particularly
vulnerable to adverse shocks, they have multiple pathways for those
shocks to spread to other actors, they present significant informational
asymmetries, and their market is growing. All of these elements
indicate that fintech could potentially serve as a catalyst for wider
losses in cases of extreme events, some of which may be predictable and
others of which may not. The possibility of such externalities, and
related market failures, suggest that government regulation to contain
the risks of inefficient and harmful behavior in fintech is essential. But
fintech presents a unique set of regulatory difficulties that are less
prevalent in more traditional forms of finance.
It is well recognized that effective regulatory regimes require
effective monitoring regimes. 182 A regulator cannot constrain the
https://www.wsj.comlarticles/j-p-morgan-leapfrogs-over-wells-fargo-in-market-capitalization-
1473782816 (last updated Sept. 13, 2016, 5:16 PM) [https://perma.cc/F5K2-TPVU].
178. SPARKLABS GLOB. VENTURES, FINTECH INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 21 (2016),
https://www.slideshare.net/bernardmoonlfntech-industry-report-2016 [https://perma.cclRN6Z-
DF6T].
179. Laura Noonan, Growth of Fintech Forecast to Spur Almost 2m Banking Job Cuts, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.ft.com/contentleOOf8884-f65c-11e5-96db-fc683b5e52db
[https://perma.cc/AEE5-QDZ2].
180. Jamie Lee, Singapore, London in Race to Be Top Global Fintech Hub, BUS. TIMES (Sept.
30, 2016), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/banking-finance/singapore-london-in-race-to-be-top-
global-fintech-hub [https://perma.cc/BME2-QNLA].
181. One study concluded that 10% of total investable wealth will be in robo-advising funds by
2025. MyPrivateBanking, Robo Advisors vs. Human Financial Advisors: Why Not Both?, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 21, 2017, 11:03 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/hybrid-robo-advisors-wil-
manage-10-of-all-investable-assets-by-2025-2017-11-21 [https://perma.cc/M34G-BSMT]. The
World Economic Forum has estimated that 10% of global gross domestic product will be stored on
the blockchain by 2027. GLOB. AGENDA COUNCIL ON THE FUTURE OF SOFTWARE & SoC'Y, WORLD
ECON. FORUM, DEEP SHIFT: TECHNOLOGY TIPPING POINTS AND SOCIETAL IMPACT (2015),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFGAC15_TechnologicalTippingPoints-report_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7GGV-6TTK].
182. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECoN. 169, 172-73 (1968); Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & David Rosenberg, A New Model of
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behavior of relevant actors if it cannot observe their behavior, or even
identify the relevant actors in the first place. 183 One of the criticisms of
financial regulators after the crisis, after all, was that the regulators
had not properly monitored the complex derivatives and other financial
instruments that banks were creating in large numbers. These
instruments ultimately caused widespread losses for banks and
threatened the stability of the financial system.184 In the wake of this
monitoring failure, legislation was passed to improve the monitoring
capabilities of regulators. As mentioned above in Section II.B, these
efforts included additional disclosure requirements for large banks,
periodic stress tests to assess the riskiness of bank behavior, and new
monitors tasked with identifying systemic risks posed by large banks
as they emerged.185 These reforms have contributed to a significant
drop in the overall risk metrics of systemically important financial
institutions.1 86 But regardless of what we may think about the success
of financial regulators in reining in the behavior of large financial
institutions since the financial crisis, regulators at least benefit from
the fact that the relevant players are readily identifiable and their
behaviors are subject to extensive disclosure requirements. Both of
these assumptions are highly questionable in the fintech arena.
First, fintech's structure renders it more difficult for regulators
to identify the relevant actors for regulation. As discussed above,
fintech is in many ways defined by its decentralized nature, relying on
dispersed networks of small actors and, sometimes, algorithms for
decisionmaking. This decentralization serves as a barrier to effective
monitoring. The virtual currency Bitcoin provides a good example of the
magnitude of the problem. If a regulator desires to increase its
monitoring of Bitcoin, where does it start? The currency is a product of
a decentralized network of computers with no central control and
Administrative Enforcement, 93 VA. L. REV. 1983 (2007); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON. 133, 135-
39 (1992) (discussing several monitoring regimes and the associated pros and cons); George J.
Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970) (discussing enforcement
mechanisms for effective regulatory regimes).
183. See Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401, 442-43
(2016) ("If the expected risk were not observed, agencies would be hard pressed to justify continued
regulation.").
184. See Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 118-19 (discussing the sometimes-perverse effects
certain types of regulation can have on financial stability).
185. See supra Section II.B.
186. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 109 (2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC%202016%20Annual
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3J4-PPG9] (observing that "[s]ince the financial crisis, the
largest [bank holding companies] have reduced leverage and become better prepared to manage
draws on liquidity, significantly improving their resilience").
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operating through consensual group dynamics. It could, of course, focus
on the creator of the system-but it turns out that the creator is a
shadowy figure going by the name of Satoshi Nakamoto who is still the
subject of much uncertainty, including whether he is a single person at
all. 187 It could, instead, focus on the Bitcoin exchanges, where a portion
(but not all) of bitcoin transfers (but not all transactions) occur. Or it
could focus on the bitcoin miners, who are (in a sense) creating
additional bitcoins, but the miners are often anonymous individuals
located in such disparate locations as Iceland, 188 Mongolia, 189 and
Tibet. 190 It could also focus on the individuals using Bitcoin to enter into
transactions, but the process of identifying these actors is difficult as
well, given Bitcoin's anonymity. 191 These are difficult questions, and
perhaps the best approach would be to tackle all of the above. But
regardless of the eventual approach adopted, the disaggregated nature
of fintech makes this process difficult and costly. And all of these
questions will need to be answered anew as new services and products
arise.
Second, fintech's structure also makes it more difficult for
regulators, once they have identified the relevant actors, to monitor the
actors' behavior. Even setting aside the fact that many of the actors may
not be located within a country's jurisdiction, and thus may escape the
authority of regulators, the activities of many fintech firms are not
subject to the substantial disclosure regimes that large banks are, and
the complex workings of their algorithms are not always easily
understood. 192 When asked about interactions with regulators, the head
of one fintech start-up stated that "[m]ost of our interaction has largely
187. Adrian Chen, We Need to Know Who Satoshi Nakamoto Is, NEW YORKER (May 9, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/we-need-to-know-who-satoshi-nakamoto-is
[https://perma.cc/5XLL-XAKE].
188. Nathaniel Popper, Into the Bitcoin Mines, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 31, 2013),
https:/dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/into-the-bitcoin-mines/ [https://perma.cc/ZH5G-U6CC].
189. Bitcoin: The Magic of Mining, ECONOMIST (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.economist.com/
news/business/21638124-minting-digital-currency-has-become-big-ruthlessly-competitive-
business-magic [https://perma.cc/TS2R-WRR3].
190. Simon Denyer, The Bizarre World ofBitcoin "Mining" Finds a New Home in Tibet, WASH.
POST (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/worldlasia-pacific/in-chinas-tibetan-
highlands-the-bizarre-world-of-bitcoin-mining-finds-a-new-home/2016/09/12/7729cbea-657e-1 1e6-
b4d8-33e93lb5a26d-story.html?utmterm=.bef7286d503f [https://perma.cclF3E2-ZXCT.
191. Tu & Meredith, supra note 72, at 297-99.
192. Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1668-70 (2015). In an interesting twist, however, regulators have increasingly
adopted the "big data" methods of fintech firms to further their own policies. See Rory Van Loo,
Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267 (2017) (discussing the "big data" method).
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been explaining what we do and how we work." 193 Indeed, a slew of
recent white papers and research reports have lamented that regulators
lack basic understandings about the workings and applications of
fintech businesses. 1 94
These two features (the protean nature of the actors, and the
lack of information about their actions) contribute to a more general
problem of regulatory opacity in the industry. When a market poses a
systemic risk to the economy, regulators have a legitimate interest in
monitoring the behavior of actors within the industry to constrain
excessively risky behavior. But monitoring depends on transparency;
without accurate and timely information about the creation of risk
within an industry, regulators cannot take action to prevent or mitigate
systemic risks as they arise. Where the number of actors is large and
their behaviors are not subject to easy verification-that is, where the
opacity of an industry from the perspective of regulators is high-
monitoring can break down. It is precisely in these scenarios that
regulation is least effective as a constraint on behavior.
In sum, by contributing to the fragmentation of finance, fintech
may be obscuring risk. Its model bears many of the features of systemic
risk, and the level of such risk is likely to increase as the industry
grows. But recent regulation of the financial industry has focused on a
different segment of the market and has largely ignored the unique
problems associated with fintech. As a result, regulators have neither
the tools nor the expertise necessary to properly guide and constrain
the behavior of fintech firms.
C. Reputation and Cooperative Behavior
As demonstrated above, fintech presents many of the features of
an industry that poses a systemic risk to the broader economy. Adding
to this problem, regulators are ill equipped to monitor and constrain
that risk. This is a worrisome situation. It might, however, be remedied
through private sector mechanisms if fintech players were able and
willing to cooperate in pursuit of longer-term interests. In the absence
of legal constraints, fintech could potentially develop mutually value-
193. Katy Burne, Fed Outlines Approach to Monitoring Fintech, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-expected-to-outline-approach-to-monitoring-fintech-1480935601
(last updated Dec. 5, 2016, 2:33 PM) [https://perma.cc/8RTK-NWZF].
194. See, e.g., David Mills et al., Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and
Settlement 34 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2016-095, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2881204 [https://perma.cc/SS2D-G2E3]
(concluding that "the industry's understanding and application of [distributed ledger] technology
is still in its infancy").
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enhancing behaviors on a voluntary basis to fill the void and reduce
risk.
The conditions under which private sector cooperation may
develop are by now well established. Actors, for example, are often
willing to cooperate in pursuit of the collective interest, even at the cost
of their short-term interests, if they perceive a more durable interest in
maintaining their reputation. 195 The classic demonstration of this
dynamic in game theory is the iterated prisoner's dilemma.196 In a
prisoner's dilemma, the players can maximize their value by
cooperating (for example, refusing to speak to the jailers), but each
individual actor has an incentive to cheat (by ratting out his partner).
If the game is only played once, the rational choice is to cheat. But of
course, if each actor takes this choice, they will end up with the jointly
minimizing outcome (both going to jail for long periods).197 The game
changes, however, if it is known that it will be repeated. In iterated
prisoner's dilemmas, rational cooperation can develop, as each party
knows that if he cheats in one round, he may earn a reputation for being
a cheater, and thus be "punished" in future rounds.198 "Tit-for-tat"
strategies, in which one party punishes the other party for
noncooperative behaviors, can encourage the establishment of stable
and persistent forms of cooperation. 199 In other words, when parties
know that they are repeat players and that they will interact with one
another in the future, cooperation becomes, if not likely, at least more
probable. Players become more willing to sacrifice short-term interests
in pursuit of long-term gains.
The financial industry has seen this scenario play out in
multiple instances during past financial crises. One famous example
from the 2008 financial crisis was when the heads of the largest
investment banks on Wall Street (including Goldman Sachs, Merrill
195. See, e.g., JAMES MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 241-44 (1994)
(explaining the balance between collective interests and short-term individual interests); Rachel
Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation, 50 HARv. INT'L L.J. 231, 244-49 (2009) (discussing
the importance of cooperation for long-term collective interests); Magnuson, supra note 9
(discussing long-term and short-term interests); Ariel Porat & Robert E. Scott, Can Restitution
Save Fragile Spid4rless Networks?, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 7-21),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2946404 [https://perma.cc/L2LM-9X8B]
(exploring business networks and some externalities that accompany them); Reinhard Selten, The
Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127 (1978) (explaining the concept of collective
interest versus individual interest); Tirole, supra note 9 (exploring how individual reputations
form group reputation).
196. See MORROW, supra note 195, at 262-68 (discussing the prisoner's dilemma).
197. Id.
198. PETER ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 447-48 (1986).
199. Richard Axelrod, The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, in
GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND SIMULATED ANNEALING 32-41 (Lawrence Davis ed., 1987).
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Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and JPMorgan) met to coordinate their actions
in response to the impending failure of Lehman. 200 This action was
made possible by the fact that the actors were readily identifiable and
could all meet in a single room.
But there are several reasons to believe that cooperative
behavior is less likely to evolve in the fintech sector than in traditional
finance. First, because fintech is defined by its disruption of traditional
forms of finance, norms of behavior are still nascent and ill formed.
Fintech is pioneering new forms of finance, and the rules of the road are
still being established. Reputation is most effective, however, when
norms of behavior are clear and easily communicated. 20 1 When norms
are unclear, actors are less likely to cooperate in pursuit of reputational
gains because the costs from breaking any norms that are being
developed are lower. 202 Indeed, without reliable expectations about
what counts as cooperative behavior, reputation may have no
normative force at all. 2 0 3 For example, let us assume that debt
crowdfunding companies can reap short-term gains by allowing
excessively risky loans to be placed on their platforms, increasing the
total volume of loans from which they derive fees while simultaneously
offloading the risk of those loans to third-party lenders. Overall, fintech
companies might be better off if they implemented policies to identify
excessively risky (or even fraudulent) loans before they were placed on
their platforms, but any single fintech actor would benefit in the short
term from not implementing these policies and capturing that slice of
the market. 204 This is a classic problem in finance: banks often have
incentives to increase risk so long as the risks are borne by third
200. William D. Cohen, Three Days That Shook the World, FORTUNE,
http://archive.fortune.com/galleries/2008/fortune/0812/gallery.threedays.fortune/index.html (last
updated Dec. 16, 2008, 4:23 PM) [https://perma.cclC6QJ-V5B9].
201. See Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 1095,
1108 (1986) (discussing the importance of social norms for reputation to be effective); Robert D.
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the
New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1670 (1996) (discussing reputation as being tied to
norms).
202. See Axelrod, supra note 201, at 1105.
203. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 31 (2005)
(arguing that cooperation between countries is only possible when "the parties ... know what
counts as cooperation and what counts as cheating'); William Magnuson, The Domestic Politics of
International Extradition, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 839, 897-99 (2012) (describing the effects of
compliance uncertainty).
204. On the other hand, some commentators argue that fintech should have no role in vetting
the riskiness of loans on their peer-to-peer markets. Instead, borrowers and lenders should bear
full responsibility for assessing the costs and benefits of loans. Bill Frezza, Caveat Emptor





parties. 205 Reputation might serve as a disciplining force to push fintech
firms toward the cooperative action-in this case, implementing risk
compliance procedures. But given the newness of the industry, the
strength of the norms surrounding acceptable behavior will likely be
low. As a result, the violation of the nascent norm would likely carry
few reputational consequences.
Second, the diffusion of information about cooperative behavior
within fintech is hindered by the sheer number of actors within the
field. Reputation is most powerful when the number of actors is small.
As economist Mancur Olson has described it, "unless the number of
individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest,
rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common
or group interests." 206 This is so because reputation can only affect
behavior to the extent information about past actions is reliably
transmitted to other actors.20 7 Parties, after all, have to observe the
behaviors of other actors before they can change their actions based on
the reputation of others. And if parties recognize that their reputations
will not be affected by their actions, or indeed, if they lack any useful
reputation at all, then their actions will not be skewed by reputational
effects. 208 In the crowdfunding example above, the problem is
immediately evident. A 2015 study found that there were more than
1,250 crowdfunding companies operating in the field already and that
the number would likely grow in coming years. 209 The cost of monitoring
the behavior of thousands of actors is prohibitively high for most
companies. Perhaps companies could reach a mutual agreement on
monitoring a subset of the actors or sharing information about the
205. From the People, for the People, supra note 175.
206. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 1-2 (1965); see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1132-33 (1999) (discussing collective interest issues);
Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, in
COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 1, 19-20 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986) (discussing common
interests).
207. See Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 100-02 (2011) (discussing morallhazard and its reliance on information
transmission); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1012-13 (1997) (discussing "norm-based" incentives); Roy Shapira, A
Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2015) (suggesting that
corporate law serves to produce information).
208. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 206, at 1130-31 (concluding that "n-state prisoner's
dilemmas and coordination games tend to be solved, if at all, by treaty or other international
agreement, and not by decentralized evolution").
209. See David Drake, 2,000 Global Crowdfunding Sites to Choose from by 2016: Top 5 Growth




practices of others in the industry, but such a result is unlikely given
that it would require, again, agreement between a large number of
actors. And even to the extent that they did agree to monitor the
behavior of other actors in the field, it is far from clear that they could
gather the information they would need to ensure cooperation. The vast
majority of crowdfunding platforms are not public and thus do not
disclose information widely. Given the dearth of information and the
difficulties of diffusing that information within the industry, reputation
is less likely to serve as a carrot or stick to encourage fintech companies
to take cooperative actions.
Third, fintech firms are less likely to engage in cooperative
behaviors because of the small size of the firms involved in the sector.
It has long been recognized that collective goods are more likely to be
provided when large actors dominate the landscape. 210 This is so
because large actors have a greater stake in the game and thus capture
a greater percentage of any gains from provision of the good in
question. 211 Climate change provides a simple example of this point.
The environment is a public good that provides benefits to all, but each
individual state has an interest in allowing its own companies to fully
exploit the environment without regard to global emissions. The
fundamental problem that prevents states from adopting the mutually
optimal level of regulation is that the benefits to individual states from
a healthy environment are generally insufficient to outweigh the (short-
term) costs from adopting stringent environmental regulations. The
210. See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) (discussing size of firms and its effect on collective goods); CHARLES
KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION, 1929-1939 (1974) (discussing collective interests and
size of firms); Charles Kindleberger, Systems of International Economic Organization, in MONEY
AND THE COMING WORLD ORDER (David Calleo ed., 1976) (discussing the effect of large firms on
collective good); William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral Enforcement,
51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 360, 376-79 (2013) (regarding size of financial firms and collective
interests); Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 INT'L ORG. 579 (1986)
(explaining that large actors have more of an effect on collective interests).
211. Another form of this dynamic arises in the game-theoretical model of "contribution
games." Contribution games are games in which the actors seek to produce a socially desirable
public good of some sort-for example, systemic stability. The public good is only provided if the
amount of contributions reaches a set level of K. Each actor must decide whether to make
successive contributions to the production of the public good. Unless and until the total amount of
contributions reaches K, then the public good will not be produced and the players will not receive
the concomitant benefits, even if the efficient outcome is for the players to contribute sufficient
amounts of resources to ensure that the public good is provided. The efficient outcome may,
however, be produced if the project would be completed by one player if that player were the sole
player. In other words, if the benefits to a single player from the production of the good are equal
to or greater than K, then the public good will be produced. As the size of an actor increases (and
therefore the portion of any benefits from the public good increases), the likelihood that this
condition will prove true increases as well. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, Joint Projects Without
Commitment, 58 REv. ECON. STUD. 259, 262-68 (1991).
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likelihood of this calculus tipping in favor of mutually beneficial
regulation, however, increases as the size of the actors increases. Larger
states capture greater shares of aggregate benefits, and thus, assuming
a set cost for adopting environmental regulation, larger states will be
more likely to realize sufficient gains from the collective good so as to
offset the costs of greater regulation. At the extreme, if there were only
one state, that state would capture all of the gain from a healthy
environment, and thus it would have an incentive to engage in the
efficient level of regulation (whatever that level might be). The same
dynamic applies in the financial sector. Large actors are more likely to
engage in cooperative actions that benefit the system as a whole (for
example, maintaining adequate capital ratios or refraining from
excessively risky bets that impose externalities on others) because they
capture a larger portion of system-wide benefits-in this case, systemic
stability. Fintech actors, however, are generally much smaller than
traditional players in finance, and thus are less likely to take
cooperative actions that contribute to reducing systemic risk because
they capture smaller portions of systemic benefits. 212 Instead, given
their small share of any benefits from public goods they could contribute
to providing, they are more likely to focus on short-term, self-interested
behaviors that provide them with immediate benefits.
Finally, cooperative behaviors are less likely to develop in
fintech because of the short time horizons of actors in the field. One
important assumption that underlies game theoretical models of
cooperative behavior is that players must reasonably believe that they
will receive sufficient benefits from future periods to offset any short-
term losses. 213 In other words, if the future benefits from being
perceived as a "cooperative" player are sufficiently high, players will be
willing to take actions that are costly in the short term. But the nature
of the fintech industry undermines this assumption. Fintech is a
winner-take-all market: the companies that can gain an early lead in
the deployment of technology to the market, and thus attract a stable
customer base, often end up continuing to succeed in the future. 214
Those that are slow to enter the market, or who do not grow quickly,
212. The question of how to determine "size" is a difficult one. But on most reasonable
metrics-revenue, number of employees, market share-fintech firms are significantly smaller
than Wall Street financial institutions. See The Fintech Revolution, supra note 2.
213. The point here is twofold. First, if actors have very high discount rates-that is, they care
little about their future welfare and very much about their present welfare-then they will be less
likely to cooperate in any given period. Second, if the costs of cooperating, or the benefits from not
cooperating, are high, then they will also be less likely to cooperate. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra
note 206, at 1126-27.
214. Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe SAFE, 102 VA. L.
REV. ONLINE 168, 172-73 (2016).
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are often doomed to failure. Indeed, fintech firms fail at a surprisingly
high rate; one study found that the median lifespan of a Bitcoin
exchange was 381 days. 215 Thus, fintech firms are not playing an
indefinite game. The game, instead, rewards those players that take an
early lead. Adding to the problem is that many of the investors in
fintech are venture capital firms. 216 It has long been recognized that
venture capitalists encourage companies to expand as rapidly as
possible. 217 This single-minded focus on growth encourages excessive
risk-taking by companies, a dynamic that is not conducive to the
development of cooperation.
For all of these reasons-the disruptive nature of the industry,
the large number of actors, their small size, and the rewards for early-
stage growth-fintech firms are less likely to develop cooperative
behaviors in support of systemic stability. Unlike more established
players in finance, who have large stakes in the orderly continuation of
current structures, fintech firms are incentivized to focus on short-term
gains at the expense of potentially value-creating, but long-term,
activities.
IV. FINANCIAL REFORM IN THE FINTECH ERA
The financial crisis brought into sharp relief the dangers that
large financial institutions pose to the broader economy: through
excessive leverage and the placing of risky bets on complex financial
instruments, banks created an environment in which economic shocks
could ripple through the industry, creating wider and wider damage
until the point when the economy as a whole faced paralysis. In the
wake of the crisis, legislators acted to rein in systemic risk, imposing a
slew of new requirements on banks and other "systemically important"
financial institutions to resolve the "too big to fail" problem. But this
legislation largely overlooked the systemic risk that can be created, not
by large institutions, but by small ones. In fact, small financial
institutions in many ways are more likely to pose systemic risk concerns
than large ones, given the particular dynamics inherent in
decentralized, disaggregated markets.
215. Tyler Moore & Nicolas Christin, Beware the Middleman: Empirical Analysis of Bitcoin-
Exchange Risk, in LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE VOL. 7859: FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
AND DATA SECURITY 25, 28 (Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi ed., 2013).
216. See Christine Parajon Skinner, Whistle blowers and Financial Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV.
861, 874 (2016).
217. See Antonio Davlia et al., Venture Capital Financing and the Growth of Startup Firms,
18 J. BUS. VENTURING 689 (2003); David Kirsch et al., Form or Substance: The Role of Business
Plans in Venture Capital Decision Making, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 487 (2009).
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Fintech presents precisely this type of systemic risk. Fintech
firms have exploded onto the scene in rapid fashion since the financial
crisis, disrupting the financial industry on a number of fronts. While
these innovations have provided great benefits to consumers, the
fintech model presents a number of systemic risk concerns based on its
disaggregated nature. Simultaneously, regulators have struggled to
identify the relevant fintech actors and monitor their behaviors in order
to mitigate these risks. And given the incentives in the fintech industry
for fast growth at the earliest stage, it is unlikely that fintech players,
at least initially, will voluntarily develop the kind of cooperative
behaviors that support systemic stability.
Fintech raises the possibility of systemic risk, evades effectual
monitoring, and disincentivizes cooperation. What, then, can be done
about it? Ultimately, the goal of eliminating systemic risk is likely to
prove futile. Systems naturally evolve and change over time, and no
system is bulletproof. But the goal of any financial regulatory regime
must be to limit the likelihood and magnitude of economic damage and
to contain that damage to the participants that knowingly and
voluntarily take part in the sector. This Section argues that four
changes to current regulation would make significant progress toward
accomplishing these goals. First, regulators should adopt a "regulation
lite" model that incentivizes fintech firms to provide information to
regulators about their businesses and seek guidance on the
applicability of current law. Second, regulators should focus on limiting
contagion in the event of unexpected economic shocks. Third, regulators
should attempt to leverage the idiosyncratic knowledge of fintech firms
to encourage self-policing. Finally, regulators should work closely with
their counterparts in foreign countries to design regulations that work
on the global level.
A. Producing Information
One of the essential features of the revolution that fintech has
wrought in finance is that the problems presented by fintech are
different than the problems presented by traditional financial
institutions. Fintech operates in a fundamentally different way than
other firms in the sector (although these other institutions are
attempting to copy some of the strategies and techniques of fintech
firms), and regulation must take these differences into account. 218 One
218. Traditional banks have even gone so far as to swallow up fintech firms in order to fully
integrate fintech strategies into their own models. Indeed, large financial institutions have been
actively acquiring fintech firms in recent months to bolster their competitive positions. Jon
Marino, Big Banks Shift Fintech Strategy, CNBC (Apr. 11, 2016, 3:44 PM),
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important corollary of this proposition is that the obligations imposed
on fintech should not simply mirror those imposed on other financial
institutions. 219
Once we have accepted that financial regulation must contain
different substantive standards in fintech in order to accommodate its
essentially different business model and related risks, the focus shifts
to devising what these new standards should look like. As a starting
point, regulation must balance the desire to promote useful innovation
in the field with appropriate limits on the creation of systemic risk. But
as mentioned above, regulators currently struggle to understand and
monitor fintech's behavior. In order to remedy this problem, regulation
should be aimed at producing better quality information. 220 It can do so
in a number of ways.
To begin with, given fintech's focus on disruption and
innovation, regulation should promote observed experimentation. 221 In
other words, regulators should create incentives for fintech firms to
provide information about their business and voluntarily seek guidance
on the applicability of current regulations. One way to do this would be
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/11/big-banks-shift-fintech-strategy.html [https://perma.cc[RCM3-
4KVX].
219. While this point would appear relatively unobjectionable on its face, adoption of the
principle would in fact represent a departure from the viewpoints of several financial regulations
today. Just to cite a few of the more recent and prominent examples of what can be called the
"mirror image" rule, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency stated in its recent report on
fintech that fintech banks "will be held to the same high standards of safety and soundness, fair
access, and fair treatment of customers that all federally chartered institutions must meet."
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK
CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 1 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/
comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf [https://perma.ccl2G9B-KTF2].
In a similar vein, the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") has stated that
it is an overarching principle of the CFPB that fintech firms "must be held to the same standards
of compliance with the law" as large banks. Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director
Richard Cordray at the LendIt USA Conference, CFPB NEWSROOM (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-cfpb-director-richard-
cordray-lendit-usa-conference/ [https://perma.cc/9JA3-89DK]. One might interpret these
statements as meaning simply that regulators will pursue the same general goals in regulating
fintech as they do in regulating more traditional institutions. But a plain reading of these
statements suggests that regulators are starting with the position that fintech must abide by the
same rules.
220. A similar approach was adopted in response to concerns about the private equity and
hedge fund industries. Dodd-Frank introduced a number of revisions to the Investment Advisor
Act in order to remedy the dearth of information about these companies. Even if the changes did
not lead to substantive regulation, it put regulators on notice about the industries' landscape. See,
Dodd-Frank Act Advisory: Advisers to Private Investment Funds, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
(July 21, 2010), https://www.cov.com/-/medialfiles/corporate/publications/2010/07/dodd-frank-act--
-advisers-to-private-investment-funds.pdf [https://perma.ccl3DW6-HF9J] (detailing the Dodd-
Frank Act).
221. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 861 (2006) (describing methods by which regulation induces regulated entities to
disclose relevant information about public regulatory objectives more effectively).
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to create a kind of "regulatory sandbox," an approach adopted by the
United Kingdom. The UK's Financial Conduct Authority has created a
regulatory project that allows fintech start-ups to launch new financial
products on an accelerated basis and with minimal regulatory
barriers. 222 The advantages of such an approach are clear, as it
promotes greater transparency in the industry while simultaneously
encouraging innovation.
Importantly, given the small size of fintech firms and the
already sizeable barriers to entry in finance generally, regulation must
aim to impose minimal administrative burdens on firms. 2 2 3 While
regulatory transaction costs should presumably be taken into account
in all well-designed regulations, they do not appear to have been a
driving principle in recent financial regulation, which has focused more
heavily on imposing substantive restrictions and reporting
requirements than on reducing administrative burdens. Indeed, the
Dodd-Frank Act spans some twenty-two thousand pages of new rules
and regulations, imposing significant compliance costs on financial
institutions. 224 The potential deterrent effect of these heavy burdens on
fintech is substantial due to fintech's dependence on maintaining low
overhead and providing services at low cost. Administrative burdens,
thus, can be expected to have a disproportionately adverse effect on
fintech firms, and regulation must take this effect into account.
For these reasons, fintech regulation should be aimed at
producing higher-quality information in the most cost-effective manner
possible. While creating a "regulatory sandbox," as the Financial
Conduct Authority has done in the UK, would be one example of such
an approach, it is by no means the only method for achieving these
goals. Other ideas that have been floated include the centralization of
222. Max Colchester & Rachel Witkowski, U.K. Takes Novel Approach on Fintech, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 11, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-takes-novel-approach-on-fintech-
1460370600 [https://perma.cc/7J2X-YVLE].
223. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2007) (quantifying the substantial
regulatory costs imposed on financial institutions in the United States); John C. Coates IV, Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015)
(describing the difficulties of measuring compliance and other regulatory costs ex ante).
224. Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, Dodd-Frank Is Hurting Community Banks, N.Y. TIMES





regulatory authority,225 the creation of targeted fintech regulation, 226
and simplified registration procedures. 227
Information, however, is not a panacea. Merely increasing public
disclosure regarding the risks of fintech will not address the
fundamental sources of those risks themselves. A growing number of
studies demonstrate the limitations of disclosure as a method for
reducing systemic risk. 2 2 8 Individuals are often unable to process the
significant amounts of information available to them, and even when
they are, they often fail to change their behaviors to appropriately
reflect this information. 229 Thus, additional disclosure will likely be
insufficient to address the systemic risk concerns of fintech.
B. Limiting Contagion
Instead, fintech regulation must also impose substantive
regulations on risk. These substantive restrictions will necessarily
depend on the nature of the innovation. Restrictions on robo-advisor
platforms will likely differ from those placed on virtual currencies, as
well as from those placed on crowdfunding ventures. They will
necessarily involve difficult trade-offs between increasing stability and
enabling innovation.
But even if the substantive restrictions on fintech will vary
depending on the particular innovation or product being provided, one
common principle should underlie substantive fintech restrictions:
limiting contagion. It is likely impossible to eliminate the susceptibility
of individual fintech firms to adverse economic shocks; it is in the
nature of disruptive industries to experience high variations in results.
But while it is difficult to prevent economic shocks for particular firms,
225. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 72, at 300-13 (arguing that the regulation of virtual
currency in general, and Bitcoin in particular, has been stymied by the fragmentation of regulatory
authority among various government bodies).
226. See Dale A. Oesterle, Intermediaries in Internet Offerings: The Future Is Here, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 533, 547-49 (2015).
227. See Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The
Need for Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
439, 505-06.
228. See, e.g., OMRi BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1110 ("Most, if not all, of the risks giving rise
to the collapse of the market for securities backed by subprime mortgages were disclosed, yet the
disclosure was insufficient, in part because complexity made the risks very difficult to
understand."); Steven Davidoff Solomon & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 599, 603 (2013) (arguing that "improvements in disclosure will not do much to prevent or
minimize the effects of future crises").
229. See Solomon & Hill, supra note 228, at 603.
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it is decidedly easier to limit the mechanisms by which these shocks
spread to other firms. 230
What sorts of regulations might limit the paths of contagion? In
general, regulation will fall into two buckets: ex ante and ex post. First,
regulators should be supplied with the authority to limit propagation
mechanisms ex ante in order to prevent potential adverse correlations.
Second, regulators should be provided the authority to take concrete
and direct action to dampen shocks ex post in order to stabilize fintech
markets.231
Ex ante substantive restrictions on fintech could take a variety
of forms. As a preliminary matter, regulators could limit
interconnectedness in fintech markets. 232 For example, they could
require robo-advisors to include in their algorithms "circuit-breaker"
type features that reduce market volatility and prevent domino effects
as parties rush to limit their losses. 233 Some firms have already
included such features in their algorithms. 234 In virtual currency, ex
ante regulations might focus on ensuring the trustworthiness of
settlement mechanisms and the accuracy of distributed ledgers in order
to prevent breakdowns in the system and curtail herd behavior by
consumers.
Ex post regulatory actions, on the other hand, would focus on
dampening contagion once it has started. The traditional method for
doing so is to provide liquidity to struggling institutions in order to
reassure counterparties that losses at one institution will not spread to
others. 235 Of course, the problem with such an approach is that the very
230. See John Crawford, Wargaming Financial Crises: The Problem of (In)Experience and
Regulator Expertise, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 111, 131-41 (2014) (describing how regulators can
limit financial crises).
231. Ex ante and ex post regulations can potentially be at odds with one another. In other
words, the existence of ex post authority for regulators to dampen contagion once it has started
may increase the risk that contagion will begin in the first place, as actors, knowing that there is
a safety net in the case of failure, will be more willing to take risks. This tension is inevitable in
any regulatory regime, and thus regulators must not consider regulatory mechanisms in a vacuum.
Rather, they must consider the full range of behavioral effects that the mechanisms will have.
232. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 827-29.
233. Circuit breakers are syjtems that slow or pause trading when markets become
excessively volatile. For example, the New York Stock Exchange halts trading for a period of time
if the market drops by more than a specified percentage. Hayden C. Holliman, The Consolidated
Audit Trail: An Overreaction to the Danger of Flash Crashes from High Frequency Trading, 19
N.C. BANKING INST. 135, 144-47 (2015).
234. See Tom Anderson, Robo-Advisors May Have Too Much Control over Your Portfolio,
CNBC (July 26, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/25/robo-advisors-may-have-too-
much-control-over-your-portfolio.html [https://perma.cc/H8MQ-5ANP] (noting that after the
results of the Brexit referendum were announced and stock markets plunged, Betterment halted
trading for several hours).
235. See Crawford, supra note 230, at 133-34.
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existence of such an authority for regulators to bail out troubled
institutions can encourage excessive risk in the industry. This was
precisely the problem that Dodd-Frank and other financial regulations
were aimed to prevent. 236 But the scenario in fintech is slightly
different. Unlike "too big to fail" firms, fintech firms fail regularly and
with minimal disruption to the broader financial system, let alone the
economy generally. 237 Thus, counterparties will not have the same
incentives to encourage excessively risky behaviors, as they will know
that failure is a very real possibility. Instead, ex post regulatory actions
would focus on preventing domino effects-that is, the adverse
consequences that the failure of one institution has on another. The
willingness to allow any particular fintech firm to fail should reduce the
moral hazard problems in the industry. More importantly, focusing on
injecting capital to struggling peer-to-peer lending firms or insuring
consumers from losses would be a cost-effective way of restricting the
pathways by which contagion is spread.
C. Enabling Self-Policing
Financial regulation must be tailored to address the unique
risks of its regulated actors. Fintech, however, presents different risks
than those involved with more traditional financial services, and thus
fintech regulation must take those different risks into account. Fintech
markets are typically small and decentralized, and thus a regulatory
model aimed at producing high-quality information about fintech firms
and their businesses, while limiting administrative burdens on small
firms, is appropriate. Similarly, fintech regulation should aim to
minimize risk propagation mechanisms in fintech markets, reducing
the likelihood that adverse economic shocks to one actor will spread to
other actors. But both of these approaches to fintech regulation will not
solve another salient feature of fintech-the difficulty of identifying and
monitoring the relevant actors. In order to address this problem,
regulators should embrace the principle of self-policing. 238
It is an inherent tension in the financial industry that regulated
actors often (and perhaps always) know more about their business than
regulators do. This situation leads regulators to depend in important
236. See Coffee, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 799-801.
237. See Moore & Christin, supra note 215, at 28.
238. Self-regulation has been a focus in financial regulation for some time, as banks have long
argued that they are more capable of devising effective rules for themselves than detached
regulators are. For a discussion of the history of financial self-policing, see Saule T. Omarova, Wall




ways on financial institutions themselves for guidance on how and
where to regulate. This dependence, of course, can create opportunities
for regulatory capture, as financial institutions shape the rules and
regulations to benefit their interests. 239 It is now a commonplace belief
that regulatory capture contributed to the creation and propagation of
the 2008 financial crisis, at least in part by causing regulators to look
the other way as financial institutions engaged in risky behaviors. 240
Despite these concerns about self-policing, it is likely that any effective
regulatory regime for fintech will involve a substantial amount of
voluntary self-monitoring. 2 4 1
It is important to note at the outset that self-policing does not,
in this context, mean that each individual firm will be solely responsible
for monitoring and reporting its compliance with regulatory obligations.
Certainly this is an essential element of any regulatory regime, as no
regulator can observe the activities of all actors at all times. But well-
designed self-policing regimes encourage actors to monitor each
other.242 Rather than relying on a centralized regulator to observe and
enforce the laws, self-policing leverages the knowledge and expertise of
multiple, dispersed actors to increase compliance. 243
Fintech is a prime candidate for self-policing for a number of
reasons. Fintech firms are in possession of idiosyncratic information
that is poorly understood by outsiders. Robo-advisors know their
businesses and investment algorithms better than anyone else.
Crowdfunding sites understand their models and related
vulnerabilities better than anyone else. Virtual currency platforms
239. Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION AND How TO LiMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David
A. Moss eds., 2014). For a general discussion of capture theory, see George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
240. See Levitin, supra note 154, at 2041-49 (summarizing the "regulatory capture
narrative"); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in
Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 623 (2012) (identifying "pervasive regulatory
capture and lack of consistent representation of the public interest in long-term financial stability"
as a critical flaw in existing financial regulation).
241. Indeed, regulatory capture may actually provide another reason why regulators should
take a light hand in imposing broad, obligatory compliance procedures on the fintech industry.
Some observers have noted that one rationale behind newly proposed OCC regulations of fintech
companies is to protect incumbent banks. Pete Schroeder, New Banking Regulator Defends Agency
Effort to Regulate Fintech, REUTERS (July 19, 2017, 12:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-banks-fintech-idUSKBN1A41ZP?il=0 [https://perma.cc/7GX2-HNSK]. To the extent that large
banks have already captured financial regulators, they may well encourage regulators to impose
excessively burdensome requirements on new fintech competitors in order to prevent fintech from
making inroads into their businesses.
242. For a discussion of the benefits of banks monitoring risk-taking at other banks, see
Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262 (2013).
243. See id. at 1281-96 (describing the methods that financial institutions use to impose
discipline on other financial institutions).
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understand the way that their currencies work better than anyone else.
All of these actors are better placed than regulators to identify material
risks in their industries, such as the introduction of new players or the
discovery of unexpected features. Thus, they have the ability to identify
relevant players and monitor their behavior much more effectively than
outside regulators. Fintech firms are also closely attuned to the
activities of their competitors. Fintech firms are constantly reviewing
the competitive landscape to identify ways to improve their business,
and, at least in virtual currency, much of the technology is "open
source," allowing fintech firms greater visibility into the functioning of
alternative firms. Thus, self-policing is likely to be particularly effective
in the fintech sector.
The more difficult question, of course, is whether fintech will be
willing to regulate itself. Monitoring is costly, and thus companies may
not be willing to expend the resources necessary to do it, or they may
not monitor at the optimal level. Even if they do discover risks in their
industry that could potentially create negative externalities for third
parties, they may have incentives to refrain from changing their
behaviors to curtail these risks if the suspect behaviors are profitable.
Thus, regulators will need to find ways to incentivize fintech to engage
in an efficient level of self-policing.
One particularly powerful way to do this is to leverage collective
sanctions, imposing costs on the group when an actor misbehaves.
Collective sanctions are an effective way to utilize the superior
information held by individual actors in a group and motivate them to
use that information advantage to advance regulatory interests. 244 By
allowing regulators to impose costs on an industry as a whole, rather
than requiring them to identify individual bad actors, collective
sanctions can incentivize individual companies to monitor the
potentially risky behaviors of other members of their group. For
example, regulators might signal to debt crowdfunding platforms that
if a high number of loans in the industry default, the regulators will
ratchet up the regulatory burdens on the industry as a whole. An
alternative way to do this would be to impose the collective sanctions
prematurely in the form of insurance for instance, all debt
crowdfunding companies could be required to contribute to an
insurance fund to pay for bad debts in the event of systemic shock. Such
a scenario, while marking a radical departure from current regulatory
approaches, would encourage fintech companies to police themselves. 2 4 5
244. See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345 (2003).
245. One important component of this process would, of course, be to identify the relevant
"group" for sanctions. This would not be a simple or uncontroversial process, given the diversity of
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The benefits of self-policing are evident: it requires little
intrusion from government regulators, it imposes fewer administrative
burdens on firms, and it leverages the superior knowledge of industry
actors. In an industry that is disruptive and innovative, it mitigates the
problem that any laws passed today will swiftly become outdated and
stale. If individual actors in the sector can be incentivized to engage in
self-policing at appropriate levels, regulators may be able to
significantly reduce systemic risk with minimal intrusion.
D. International Cooperation
Finally, financial regulation must take into account the
international dimensions of fintech. It is by now a commonplace notion
that business is more international than ever. But too often, regulation
is drafted without close scrutiny of the long-term international
consequences of particular regulatory approaches. A more
internationally minded regulatory regime would take into account
three fundamental principles: first, fintech activity is not solely
domestic, but rather crosses national borders and often raises complex
jurisdictional issues; second, regulatory actions in one country will have
effects on other countries; and third, regulators in other countries will
have useful information about the effects of particular types of fintech
regulation. All of these factors suggest that international cooperation
will be essential in designing effective fintech regulation. 246
Fintech activity is not neatly located in a single jurisdiction.
Robo-advisors can provide financial advice to consumers around the
world through their online platforms. Crowdfunding sites can connect
companies seeking capital with investors around the world. Virtual
currencies are created and maintained by dispersed sets of computers
fintech actors and the constantly evolving nature of the industry. But regulators constantly go
through similar exercises in identifying their relevant "regulated groups," and, as long as this
process is done transparently and in good faith, it could lead to measured improvement in the
industry.
246. There is a voluminous literature on international financial regulation and the proper role
of coordination and cooperation between national regulatory bodies. For an excellent analysis of
the SEC's efforts to address international regulatory coordination, see Howell E. Jackson,
Substituted Compliance: The Emergence, Challenges, and Evolution of a New Regulatory
Paradigm, 1 J. FIN. REG. 169 (2015). For more general analyses of the international implications
of financial regulation, see Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It
Doesn't), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011) (arguing that international financial rules are more coercive and
powerful than traditional theories of international law predict); Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of
Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447, 447-53 (2008)
(describing the importance of policy coordination in financial regulatory regimes); and Beth
Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, 55
INT'L ORG. 589 (2001) (providing a model for how and why financial regulation converges on certain
regulatory structures provided by a dominant nation).
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located in many different countries. Fintech firms are actively
searching for friendly jurisdictions in which to locate their
headquarters, and they are uniquely capable of picking up their stakes
and moving elsewhere. 247 As a result of the cross-border aspects of many
fintech services, multiple regulators will have legitimate interests in
regulating the activities of fintech actors. This means that fintech
regulation will need to contain a substantial extraterritorial dimension
in order for its dictates to be effective. It also means that overly
burdensome fintech regulation in a single jurisdiction will have
particularly consequential effects on the country's fintech industry.
Unlike with traditional finance, where it is highly unlikely that any
large bank of a sufficient size would attempt to completely abandon a
significant market, with fintech, regulatory costs will likely play an
important role in deciding where fintech locates itself in the first place.
As a consequence, regulators must recognize that their own
regulations will have effects on other countries. In other words, there
will be important distributional effects of adopting one particular
regulatory regime over another. For example, if regulators impose
particularly burdensome fintech regulations on actors in their own
jurisdiction, this may cause fintech activity (and the tax and
employment benefits thereof) to shift away from their own jurisdictions
and into others. Or, conversely, if regulators adopt fintech-friendly
regulations, they will be able to attract fintech companies to their
countries. In some cases, this dynamic may lead to a "race to the
bottom," in which countries compete to constantly lower the regulatory
burdens in their own jurisdictions, with the ultimate result being
excessively lax regulation that leads to abusive practices. 248 But of
course, the "race to the bottom" is not the only potential dynamic; in
some circumstances, we may witness a "race to the top," in which
regulators compete to adopt better designed, more efficient
regulations. 249 A third dynamic, and potentially the most worrisome
one, would be overlapping and conflicting regulations, where
regulators, concerned with domestic priorities, fail to take into account
other countries' rules, and thus fintech firms find themselves having to
navigate a maze of legal rules and restrictions that inhibit their ability
247. For a discussion of the increasing ability of firms to restructure and relocate in order to
avoid burdensome regulation, see William Magnuson, Unilateral Corporate Regulation, 17 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 521 (2016).
248. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 132-35 (2001).
249. See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy
Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 260-61 (1980); Frank H. Easterbrook,




to operate efficiently. Whether regulatory competition in fintech will
lead to the "Delaware effect," the "California effect," or the more
insidious "anarchy effect" remains to be seen, but regulators must
carefully consider the effects of their rules on other countries, and how
those rules will interact with each other.
Finally, fintech regulators must recognize, and take advantage
of, the useful information that foreign regulators will have with respect
to their own experiences with fintech. Even if regulatory competition is
inevitable, such competition does not necessarily need to foreclose the
possibility of regulatory cooperation. Systemic risk, after all, does not
respect national borders. The financial crisis started in the United
States but quickly spread to other countries, in some cases causing even
more disruption abroad than it did in the United States. 250
Governments, thus, have an interest in cooperating to prevent systemic
risk from materializing in the fintech sector. They also have a broader
interest in ensuring that fintech is not used to evade national
regulations. These important governmental interests provide an
opportunity for regulators to cooperate to create responsible and
appropriate measures to respond to and limit systemic risk factors in
the fintech sector.
This does not mean that fintech regulation must be uniform. In
fact, uniformity is both unlikely and undesirable at this stage of
fintech's development. Much as the federal system in the United States
is valued for its ability to allow state governments to serve as
"laboratories of democracy," 251 national regulators must be free to
experiment with their own types of fintech regulation based on their
own unique interests and concerns. Already, national governments
have adopted a plethora of different approaches to fintech. Hong Kong
has adopted a regulatory sandbox that allows fintech firms to launch
new financial products without complying with the usual regulatory
250. Just to take one example, Iceland suffered a particularly severe banking crisis. Within
the course of a single week, Icelandic banks with assets worth fourteen times the country's GDP
failed, and the country's currency dropped 70%. Iceland Lifts Capital Controls, EcONOMIST (Mar.
18, 2017), https://www.economist.comlnews/finance-and-economics/21718889-last-country-marks-
symbolic-recovery-its-financial-meltdown-iceland [https://perma.cc/7RCT-XRUE].
251. Justice Louis Brandeis is credited with the creation of the "laboratory of democracy"
model of federalism. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, he wrote in dissent that "[i]t is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Whether states actually do innovate
at efficient levels is, however, a matter of some controversy. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy,
Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333
(2009); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?,
9 J. LEGAL STuD. 593 (1980).
1224 [Vol. 71:4:1167
REGULATING FINTECH
requirements. 2 5 2 Britain has done the same, and even more recently,
announced a "fintech salon," that aims to bring together the Bank of
England, fintech companies, investors, and the Financial Conduct
Authority to have open conversations about developments in the
sector. 253 U.S. regulators are still in the early stages of developing their
own response to fintech, with several bodies issuing white papers and
other proposals. 254 Thus, fintech regulation is already emergent and
diverse, and it will likely develop in unexpected ways. But it also
presents a great opportunity, as regulators are just beginning to
grapple with the difficult questions presented by the vast array of
fintech innovations on the market. Regulators are adopting different
mechanisms to promote innovation while constraining undesirable
behavior. Some mechanisms will prove effective, while others will fall
by the wayside. Regardless of the results of these various experiments,
regulators will learn much from the process of experimentation itself,
and it is important for these lessons to be shared between regulators.
Regulators would be well advised to establish networks for formal and
informal exchanges of information on a regular basis. These networks
will likely prove essential in improving and revising financial
regulation in light of fintech innovation.
Thus, well-designed fintech regulation will necessarily have an
international dimension to it. It will require a careful consideration, not
just of its effects on domestic actors, but also on foreign ones. It will
require regulators to establish ties with regulators in other jurisdictions
in order to share information and prevent harmful clashes. The aim is
not so much to impose a single regulatory framework on all
jurisdictions, but rather to ensure that regulatory competition and
experimentation occurs in a way that produces useful and usable
information for governments.
CONCLUSION
After the financial crisis of 2008, it was widely recognized that
"too big to fail" financial institutions posed serious risks to the health
of the wider economy. As a result, financial regulation pivoted toward
reducing the risks posed by such large institutions, with Dodd-Frank
252. Michelle Chen & Michelle Price, Hong Kong to Launch Banking Fintech "Sandbox" As
Rivals Pull Ahead, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2016, 12:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
hongkong-banks-regulator/hong-kong-to-launch-banking-fintech-sandbox-as-rivals-pull-ahead-
idUSKCN11COEV [https://perma.cc/PP4L-NF48].
253. Clare Dickinson, Bank of England Gathers Minds for Fintech Salon, FIN. NEWS (Mar. 17,
2017), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/bank-of-england-gathers-minds-for-fintech-salon-
20170317 (last updated Mar. 17, 2017, 4:14 PM) [https://perma.cc/YG6Z-WPV7].
254. See supra note 219.
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enacting an array of reforms aimed to prevent "too big to fail" financial
institutions from coming into being in the first place, and closely
monitoring and constraining those that already existed. But this focus
on "too big to fail" financial institutions overlooks an important and
disruptive force in finance today: the rise of fintech. Fintech firms are
innovating the way that financial services are provided in an enormous
variety of areas, from asset management to capital raising to virtual
currency. Fintech promises to provide great benefits to society, as it
lowers costs and broadens access. But it also presents new and different
concerns than those presented by conventional financial institutions.
Small, disaggregated actors create their own systemic risks, risks that
are potentially more worrisome than the risks presented by more
traditional financial actors. Financial regulation must adapt to confront
these risks head on. This Article has set forth a variety of potential
regulatory responses that better address the unique risks and
vulnerabilities of fintech, but it by no means proposes to serve as the
final word on these difficult matters. Ultimately, fintech regulation will
need to be as flexible and adaptable as the fintech industry itself. No
simple task, to be sure. But if regulators are able to fashion smart and
efficient rules to guide the industry, they will play a part in enabling
one of the great innovations of our time.
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